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This thesis questions the long embraced assumption in Turkey which is based on the 
premise that single-party period of Turkey between 1925-1946 was because of the 
“conditions of the era.” By giving examples from advocates of single party, I am 
arguing against the exigency of a single-party period and I am offering that it was rather 
based on preference. By going into the subheadings of single-party advocacy, I am 
analyzing each of them and trying to show that as a whole the argument that conditions 
of the era necessitated a single-party regime is not convincing. 
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Devrimleri, Modernleşme teorisi 
 
 
 
Bu çalışmada Türkiye'de uzun süredir kabul edilen, 1925-1946 arası Tek-Parti 
Dönemi'nin koşullar gereği olduğu argümanı sorgulanmaktadır. Tek-parti 
savunucularının argümanlarından örnekler vererek, Türkiye'de Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin 
koşullar gereği değil, kişisel tercih sonucu olduğu savunulmaktadır. Tek-parti 
meşrulaştırmasının alt başlıklarına tek tek değinilerek, Türkiye'de Tek-Parti Dönemi’nin 
koşullar gereği olduğu argümanının ikna edici olmadığı öne sürülmektedir. 
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discussion a friend of mine tried to gave me the excuse “conditions of the era,” I 
counted him all I had learned from that newspaper article of Şükrü Hanioğlu.     
 I was aware with the “conditions of the era” phrase since I was in high school, 
but I never thought about it thoroughly. While I had my doubts that early republican 
period necessitated single-party rule, I had never had any idea as to how it could be 
challenged. If somebody had told me at that time that it would become my master thesis 
topic, I would probably laugh. In time, I got so obsessed with this phrase that I, with the 
encouragements of a few friends and a professor of mine,   decided to write my MA 
thesis on this defense of single-party rule, voiced with the phrase “conditions of the 
era.” Before making the decision of writing the thesis on “conditions of the era” 
advocacy, I wavered for some 9 months about writing about Kemalism as the religion of 
Turkey, 1927 elections or 1923 elections.    
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contributions to this thesis. I should be grateful to Cemil Koçak, my thesis advisor who 
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draft of the article which was turned into this thesis finally. I thank Ahmet Demirel for 
providing several articles and more important than that, encouraging me to write in 
times I was most aloof. The grammar and sentence structure would be much worse 
without my beloved sister Irem and her husband Mark's invaluable help. I got help with 
translation issues from my friends Sertaç Şen, Nadya Uygun, Funda Alkan, Emre Şahin, 
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for encouraging me to start writing at a time I had my doubts and was postponing again 
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discussions of historical materialism. 
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Introduction	  
 
 The aim of this thesis is simple, yet it will challenge a postulation that has been 
widely clinched to within the Turkish historiography: That the single-party regime of 
Turkey during the Early Republic period stemmed from a necessity which the 
conditions forced, and not preference. This claim -in fact the main thesis I hope to 
question in this work- has several sub-theses and premises, to all of which I will refer 
throughout my study in detail. I will simply argue that  the single-party regime of 
Turkey between 1925-1946 was not because of necessity; it was rather based on 
personal preference. However, to prevent questioning the founding philosophy of 
Kemalism, an apologetic item was introduced to the Turkish historiography: Conditions 
(circumstances) of the era. 
 Let me now go deeper into the thesis I will present, which is mostly based on 
challenging the Kemalist assumptions that has been widely popular in Turkey for more 
than half a century. According to the research I have made, the assumption that the 
single-party period was a necessity is based on 4 sub-theses, and to put them roughly, 
these are: a) That the Turkish republic meant transition from subject to citizen so it 
needed a transition process; b) that the authoritarian regime of Turkey should be 
accepted as normal when compared with totalitarian and/or fascist regimes of inter-war 
Europe; c) that Turkey had its unique conditions which distinguished herself from the 
rest of the world, so it needed a unique system, such as single-party rule; and d) that in a 
society where the socio-economic indicators are undeveloped/underdeveloped, 
democratic regimes can not be established and/or a single-party (tutelage party) will 
prepare the preconditions of multi-party system (modernization theory). 
 A glance at any democratic regime will already suggest that, to explain 
authoritarian rule in a society, these assumptions are not satisfactory-unless we accept 
the modernization paradigm, to which I will refer in the 3rd chapter. But there is a 
reason why I will take these into consideration and deal with them throughout this 
study. If one is to make research as to how the single-party regime of Turkey is 
justified, s/he will see that historians mostly clinch to one of these sub-theses. In other 
words, anyone who wants to read about the period between 1925-1946 in Turkey is 
most likely to come across with a sentence beginning as “Of course the Early Republic 
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of Turkey was not a democracy...”,1 and then going on to state that the conditions of the 
era were not suitable, and that “conditions not being suitable” is very likely to be based 
on one of the four items I've presented above. 
 What I hope to do in this work is to dig into all the apologist statements that 
justify authoritarian rule of single-party of Turkey and to show, one by one, why they 
are not cogent. These are assumptions that have been widely held by Kemalist2 
historians for many years. They have been repeated in history books so many times that 
they have, by now, almost become facts. I will try to show in this work how the phrase 
“conditions of the era” has become an answer to everything when the Kemalist 
founding philosophy is questioned, and why it is lacking factual evidence and therefore 
should be abandoned. 
 I will discuss the arguments of single-party advocates one by one  to see if we 
can come up with any alternative explanations. While I will present my doubts as to 
justifying the single-party regime, I am not suggesting that the premises of single-party 
exponents are totally incongruous. However, looking at the conditions at a time is 
different than the “conditions of the era” phrase becoming a grand narrative apology, 
and I regret to observe that the Turkish case is the example of the latter.   
 I will do an unusual thing for an introduction and count all the names whose 
theses I will examine and question in this work. The list includes: İlber Ortaylı, Halil 
İnalcık, Toktamış Ateş, Nevin Yurtsever Ateş, Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Anıl Çeçen, Emre 
Kongar, Sina Akşin, Nurşen Mazıcı, Ergün Aybars, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Suna Kili, 
Zafer Toprak, Hakkı Uyar, Bernard Lewis (why I have picked these names and not 
others; I will explain it in the final chapter). It should not be assumed from this literature 
review that I deliberately picked historians who defend marginal views. The approach I 
question and object in this work is more or less the official approach in Turkish 
historiography. The names I refer are historians with successful academic careers, 
without whose valuable works, our knowledge of Turkish modernization would be 
much weaker. Some of the books I refer are the ones that have been used as course book 
in universities for years. The premises I question are voiced by many historians and are 
not merely the discourse of the academy. They have long been part of the popular 
                                                
1   Anıl Çeçen, 100 Soruda Kemalizm, p. 23.  
2   “Kemalist” and “Atatürkist” are sometimes used interchangeably, sometimes with different 
2   “Kemalist” and “Atatürkist” are sometimes used interchangeably, sometimes with different 
meanings. In this thesis, I used them interchangeably. For a brief discussion as to the differences between 
the two, please see Conclusion, p. 79-80.    
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Kemalist discourse. 
 My main objective in this thesis is to inquire into the assumptions that assume 
that the Early Republican Turkey had to have a single-party regime, and that toleration 
of pluralism would prove worse. In doing so, I will touch upon certain points in each 
chapter, and here is how this work is structured: Chapter I will focus on the discussion 
of transition from subject to citizen. Considering the assumption that the people of the 
Ottoman society were subjects and that they became citizens with the Turkish Republic, 
I will probe what this means and try to see if we can come up with any other 
explanation, such as identifying this transition with the later stages of the Ottoman State 
instead of the proclamation of Turkish Republic in 1923. 
 Chapter II will be about inter-war Europe, and it will question a widely held 
belief. Was the inter-war Europe, as often asserted in the Turkish historiography, 
dominated by totalitarian or fascist regimes, and if so, can this be used as an excuse for 
the legitimization or justification of Turkish single party? The unique or unfavorable 
conditions of Turkey will be questioned, too, and in Chapter III, Turkish single-party 
period will be evaluated within the modernization paradigm. What the proponents of the 
modernization paradigm contend and how much it fits the Turkish case will be 
examined. Whether pluralism or democracy can develop in states like Turkey, and if so, 
what forestalled it will be my main focus. In doing so, I will touch upon the illustrious 
tutelage-party theory of late Duverger, and compare the Turkish case with a similar 
example, German Sonderweg.  
 Did Mustafa Kemal aim democracy in the long run, and if so, what did he do to 
help develop it? Were the socio-economic conditions of Turkey unfavorable for 
pluralism? Do the two opposition parties formed in 1924 and 1930 respectively, attest to 
Mustafa Kemal's intentions for establishing democratic regime in the long run? 
Questions like these will be addressed in this long chapter.  
 The treatment of opposition against Mustafa Kemal deserves to be discussed, 
and chapter IV will be about that. Who were the dissidents of Mustafa Kemal, and with 
what purpose did they part company with him? Were they reactionaries and 
Ottomanists, or did they take action with a different kind of agenda? What does Mustafa 
Kemal's having people that disagree with him in every group he involves tell us? How 
judicious it is to assume that the law of revolution is above all, and to assess every kind 
of opposition accordingly? Items that subsume -but are not limited to these- will be 
covered in the fourth chapter.    
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 Perhaps an important matter within the Early Republican historiography is how 
things and events are narrated by historians. What happened between 1920-1938, and 
how is this described? The language of accounts might give clue as to the stance of the 
figure who writes it, and in this regard, comparisons between Kemalist and non-
Kemalist historians -whom I will address as realists- will compose chapter V. By 
comparing a few accounts -from both sides- I will try to depict how Kemalist accounts 
are preoccupied with the justification and legitimization of almost every act of Mustafa 
Kemal's (e.g. purge of the opposition), whereas non-Kemalist accounts are only trying 
to relate what happened as it happened (in the Ranke style perhaps). 
 In the conclusion part, I will reiterate what I've discussed in the study and try to 
reach an alternative hypothesis as to “conditions of the era” discussion that justifies 
single-party domination. Here is what I suggest: The assertion that single-party rule 
emerged because of the circumstances is invented later to justify the actions of Mustafa 
Kemal which mostly aimed at crushing the opposition. I will question the assumptions 
in each chapter and suggest that, some of them not only lacks factual basis, but even if 
they are true, there can be no convincing reason to accept and justify single-party 
policy.   
 I should make one thing clear before beginning. For the ones who say “yet 
another account on the Turkish modernization...”, this work will not cover the late 
Ottoman and/or early Turkish Republic periods; neither as a whole, nor in part. The sole 
purpose of this work is to question and object to the accounts that justify the single-
party regime of Turkey. In other words, any account will be referred to as long as it 
makes claims to legitimize the actions of the period between 1925-1946, as long as it 
advocates Kemalist single-party rule. Let me give an example: Script revolution of 1928 
will not at all be a part of this work, but the so-called anthropological head skull 
measurements by Afet İnan will be. Here is the reason: 1928 script revolution is not 
identified within the Kemalist historiography as something the conditions necessitated, 
but the head skull measurements are.   
 I might have confused the reader a bit so far so I will finish this introduction 
chapter with a better explanation. During the single-party regime, some actions of the 
rulers of Turkey (e.g. head skull measurements or the Dersim massacre) were what we 
would address today as “unacceptable”. When these actions are questioned, Kemalist 
historians admit that those things are unacceptable for today, but they insist that 
considering the conditions of the era, they were normal for that time. I will, on the other 
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hand, question all the assumptions of Kemalist historians that justify single-party 
actions and try to show that they are apocryphal. I will claim that the explanations 
invented later to justify the authoritarian regime are no more than mere apology.  
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I.	  The	  Question	  of	  Transition	  from	  Subject	  to	  Citizen	  
 
 The first sub-theses of “conditions of the era necessitating single-party regime” I 
will talk about is about transition from subject to citizen. As I will give its examples 
below, the argument roughly goes like this: Because sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire 
was based on heavenly (religious) power and not on the people's power, subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire should be accepted as slaves. With the declaration of Turkish Republic 
in 1923, the period of transition from subject to citizen started. Since this transition 
necessitated a process, single-party rule during that time is natural. I should say now 
that although the meaning is roughly the same, this claim is not always uttered in this 
way, as I will show now. 
 The figure who most insists on this “transition from subject to citizen” is the late 
Toktamış Ateş. Every time Ateş talks about the meaning of Turkish Republic, he either 
uses these exact words, or their counterparts. In his article written in 1979, titled as 
“Kemalizm Dediğimiz,” he uses the words “the sovereignty of the people against 
monarchic power rooted in God”.3 Again in his book, Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz, Ateş 
uses the words “a republic where there is no Sultan and where the sovereignty is owned 
by the people.”4 Ateş likewise identifies the essence of Turkish Revolution as the 
“transition from subject to citizen”5 and again talks about how Kemalism is different 
than the theocratic ideology where the power is in God,”6 in his book, Türk Devrim 
Tarihi.  
 The last example I will give is from Ateş's article, “Kemalizm ve Özgünlüğü,” 
where he directly identifies Turkish Revolution with the phrase “transition from subject 
to citizen,” again using the words “Turkish Revolution is the transition from a theocratic 
monarchy to the sovereignty of the people.”7 What the obvious problem with this ever 
                                                
3 Toktamış Ateş, “Kemalizm Dediğimiz.” cited in Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz, p. 40. Ateş later 
published the same article in 1998 with the title “Kemalizm'in Özü” (the Essence of Kemalism).    
4 Toktamış Ateş, Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz, p. 180. 
5 Toktamış Ateş, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 243. 
6 Ibid. p. 44 
7 Toktamış Ateş, “Kemalizm ve Özgünlüğü,” cited in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm, p. 
320.  
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recurring “unique” definition of Ateş is that the later stages of the Ottoman Empire 
(such as the Reform Edict of 1856 or the II. Constitution of 1908) ended the period of 
theocratic rule in Ottoman Empire, if any such thing had ever existed.8 But I will come 
to its details later. 
 Apart from Toktamış Ateş; Emre Kongar, Suna Kili, Halil İnalcık, Ahmet Taner 
Kışlalı, Anıl Çeçen, Nevin Yurtsever Ateş and Ergün Aybars all talk about this 
transition from subject to citizen, though using different words.9 For instance, Kongar 
states in his book Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek10 (Facing with Our Democracy, UD) that 
the “Republic regime will produce Turkish citizens from the Ottoman subjects.”11 While 
Kongar, in this book, at least 10 times puts the emphasis on transition from 
religious/agricultural society to a democratic republic, it is at times uttered as “founding 
a democratic secular social law state in a Moslem society,”12 and sometimes as “a 
society where there was no substructure of democracy or consciousness of 
citizenship.”13    
 Emre Kongar talks about the same “transition from subject to citizen” matter in 
his earlier works, too. In a book he published in 1983, Kongar talks about “efforts to 
create a contemporary national state from a six-hundred-year religious/traditional 
empire structure.”14 Likewise, in another study published in 1972, Kongar makes the 
distinction between Ottoman ümmet and Turkish millet   (getting help from Ziya 
                                                
8   What the date 1908 corresponds to and how its perpetrators can be conceptualized within the Turkish 
historiography is quite debatable. While Aykut Kansu strongly argues in his published Ph. D. 
Revolution of 1908 in Turkey that it is a revolution, it should not be referred to as merely the “2nd 
constitution” and that it tried to settle a liberal democratic system (p.3), figures like Emre Kongar (as 
cited in Kansu's work) or Fevzi Demir identify it as the 2nd constitution. Ayşe Hür does not state 
whether she prefers to refer to it as revolution or coup, but she is not close to identifying it as a 
revolution for she argues that it was not a people's movement. (p. 105-106). Finally, Erik Jan Zürcher 
argues that, although  the Young Turks were against the autocratic sultan and that they struggled to 
reopen the parliament, they were not democratic (p. 138).  
In this work I will refer to this period as the “2nd Constitution”, as the usual way.   
9   The reason I wrote Toktamış Ateş to the beginning is that the term “transition from subject to 
citizen” seems to have been invented by him and then used regularly and recurrently by many 
Kemalist authors wanting to defend single-party regime.   
10   The title of the book can be translated as “Facing with Our Democracy,” but unlike what his title 
offers, Kongar not only does not face with the Turkish democracy, but advocates single-party regime 
throughout his work. His book which does not include a references section bears vague concepts such 
as “religious oligarchy” and a considerable amount of anti-Kurdish and discriminative vocabulary.   
11   Emre Kongar, Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek, p. 67. For similar statements, see p. 16, 214, 216, 217, 
223-224, 226, 259, 292.    
12   Ibid p. 114. 
13   Ibid p. 199. 
14   Emre Kongar, Devrim Tarihi ve Toplumbilim Açısından Atatürk (from now on, Atatürk), p. 326. This 
study of Kongar which is the printed version of his Ph. D. was first published with the title “Atatürk 
ve Devrim Kuramları” and then again, with the above mentioned title. The chapters talking about the 
subjective and objective conditions of a revolution in this book deserve attention and therefore, will be 
touched upon later.  
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Gökalp's historical stages, too)15 and goes on to make analysis similar to what I 
presented above. Kongar claims that Turkish Revolution transferred a feudal empire to a 
contemporary, capitalist, national state16 and that with the republic, sovereignty stopped 
getting its source from religion and tradition and was now based on the people.17 
 Let us keep illustrating the postulation of transition from subject to citizenship. 
Halil İnalcık claims that the “new state would be founded as the Turkish Republic based 
on sovereignty of the people,”18 that the new Turkish nation is a community consisting 
of equal citizens, and that people are no longer part of tebaa (religious community).19 
Likewise, Suna Kili argues in the very beginning of her book Türk Devrim Tarihi that 
the new state has changed its long duree tradition and that instead of sectarian ties, now 
national ties are holding individuals together.20 Anıl Çeçen identifies at least four times 
in his book the Turkish Republic as the transition from Ottoman monarchy based on 
single-man to modern democratic republic,21 once using the exact words “ümmet” 
(religious community) and “millet” (nation).22 Kışlalı wrote several times in his 
newspaper column that the goal of republic was to enlighten a people living in the dark 
ages and that it could be done with the will of the people,23 which again is close to the 
above mentioned argument. Nevin Yurdsever Ateş identifies the people of Turkey in 
1920's with a sense of servitude (slavery) coming from hundreds of years.24 Finally, 
Ergün Aybars takes the same stance as the previous figures, treating the Ottoman 
Empire as theocratic and Turkish Republic as a nation state, thereby corroborating this 
claim of transition from subject to citizen.25   
 Before discussing and questioning these arguments, it is worthwhile to repeat the 
above-mentioned arguments and their meaning. My main question is what the defense 
of single-party is based on, and the first sub-theses of single-party advocates I am 
discussing is the postulation that Turkish Republic meant transition from ümmet 
                                                
15   Emre Kongar, Toplumsal Değişme Kuramları ve Türkiye Gerçeği, p. 107. 
16 Ibid 353. 
17 Ibid 361. 
18 Halil İnalcık, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” cited in Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, p. 23. 
19 Halil İnalcık, “Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ve Osmanlı,” cited in Atatürk ve Demokratik Türkiye, p. 90  
20 Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. XVII. 
21 Anıl Çeçen, 100 Soruda Kemalizm, p. 62, 123, 125, 126. I will go on referring to Çeçen's book within 
this work, especially while discussing the “unique conditions of Turkey.”    
22 Ibid, 123.  
23 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Colomb'un yumurtası: Kadınlar,” Cumhuriyet, 13 Dec. 1998, cited in Ben 
Demokrat Değilim, p. 219.  
24 Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluşu ve Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (from 
now on, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası), p. 325. The exact Turkish word is kulluk anlayışı. I used 
“servitude” but “slavery,” too, can be used here.    
25 Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik Demokrasi, p. 12 and 188-189. 
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(religious community) and kul (subject) to millet (nation) and  vatandaş (citizen). This 
postulation is uttered sometimes with these exact words, as in the case of Toktamış Ateş 
and Ergün Aybars, sometimes as transition from an agricultural empire to a nation-state, 
as in the case of Emre Kongar or from the dark ages to modernity, as in the case of 
Ahmet Taner Kışlalı. 
 The first thing that should be said about this contention of transition from subject 
to citizen is that, although it is not very convincing - which I will discuss soon - it 
doesn't get enough criticism within the Turkish historiography. Maybe with a few 
exceptions including Şükrü Hanioğlu,26 it is not a topic addressed enough by Turkish 
historians. It is true that figures like Aykut Kansu, Gökhan Kaya, Fevzi Demir and 
Cemil Koçak did draw attention to the pluralistic foundations of Ottoman Empire 
during 1908-1912 and that Füsun Üstel and Kansu directly identify this transition with 
the period of 1908 (which I will illustrate below) but thinking that this debate has been 
around for a long time  - and kept lively thanks to Toktamış Ateş - it is surprising that 
the majority of the historians have not yet said a word about this debate. 
 Let me now begin by stating why this assertion of transition from subject to 
citizen is lacking factual basis, and go on discussing it. The first thing that should be 
said is that, if this transition ever took place, it was during the later stages of the 
Ottoman Empire, (that is to say during the late 19th and first decade of the 20th century) 
and not during the early years of the Turkish Republic. The assertion that Ottoman 
people were kul (subject) is obviously based on the premise that Ottoman Empire was a 
theocratic state ruled by a god-like figure, which is the summation of what the above-
mentioned figures argue. The argument will probably go like this: Turkish Republic 
created citizens, because now that the sultanate and the caliphate were abolished and 
there was a so-called parliament ostensibly taking shape with peoples' votes, these 
people are no more part of tebaa (religious community) but they are citizens.  
 This whole assertion and arguments behind it seem to make sense, only if we 
assume that Ottoman Empire was a theocratic and stable state. What I mean is that, if 
we treat the Ottoman Empire as a monolithic system which did not have any dynamics 
throughout 600 years, and if we treat Turkish Republic as as a secular, democratic 
system where everybody was equal, then the above-mentioned arguments sound 
plausible. However, anybody who is a little bit familiar with the later stages of the 
                                                
26 Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Dönemin koşulları göz önüne alınırsa,” Sabah, 4 Dec. 2011.    
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Ottoman Empire would know that starting from 1908, Ottoman Empire experienced 
political pluralism and that the creation of citizenship even goes earlier. Also, anybody 
who is familiar with the early years of Turkish Republic would know that between 
1925-1946, there was single-party rule; so if citizen bears the activity of voting or being 
equal before law, people of the early Turkish Republic can hardly be addressed as 
citizens.    
 The sources I will use while discussing whether there was citizenship in the 
Ottoman Empire belong to Akşin Somel, Aykut Kansu, Ayşe Hür, Cemil Koçak, Şükrü 
Hanioğlu, Gökhan Kaya, Füsun Üstel, Fevzi Demir and Zafer Toprak. My main aim in 
using these figures is to suggest that the later periods of the Ottoman Empire created its 
own modernity and that with its free elections, political parties, somewhat free press, 
non-governmental organizations and identified status in front of law, the people in the 
period of the Ottoman Empire between 1839-1908 were much closer to vatandaş 
(citizen), than kul (subject). I should stress here that from the following explanations, 
the thesis that there was true democracy in the Ottoman Empire should not be inferred. 
Nor do I have any intentions to magnify or overemphasize 1908, apart from asserting 
that it was part of a process that saw limited pluralism in modern Turkey.   
 As we all know, Ottoman Empire entered a period of change an modernization 
starting from the 18th or 19th centuries.27 While this process had its ups and downs, I 
think it can easily be said that concepts such as political parties, elections, charities, 
freedom of press and non-governmental organizations entered the life of Turkish people 
within this process. I will not claim that starting from 1876, the I. Constitution, Ottoman 
Empire experienced true democracy, which would be quite misleading. As Kansu 
rightly argues, perhaps the best we can say for 1876 is that it reformed the absolute 
monarchy.28 However, my contention is that starting from the second half of the 19th 
century, Ottoman modernization marked the transition from subject to citizen. 
 Let me give a few examples from the last phase of Ottoman Empire to make it 
clear. Freedom of press and the presence of political parties can be good indicators to 
point out the relatively liberal and pluralist characteristic of a state, if we are to make 
any kind of claim about transition from subject to citizen. As Toprak indicates, after in 
                                                
27 The era that marks the beginning of Ottoman -and therefore Turkish- modernization is quite 
debatable. It is often referred as the 18th century -with Selim III- or 19th century, often with Mahmud 
II. My aim here is not to discuss when it begins, but rather to argue that transition from subject to 
citizen corresponds to Ottoman modernization, and not to Turkish Republic. 
28 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 1. 
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1908, the Constitution was proclaimed for the second time, Ottoman press enjoyed 
some degree of freedom; the ensuing period would see the publishing of various 
magazines, papers and establishment of communities. Likewise, political parties were 
formed following 1908. An increase was seen in the numbers of books, papers and 
magazines which would create a relatively high readers group.29             
 If we go a little earlier and look into the 2nd half of the 19th century of the 
Ottoman Empire,  we will see that the first steps of modernization were taken. Law of 
penalty was promulgated in 1840 and was again put into effect in 1851.30 In 1871 and 
1878, laws to regulate city municipalities were also put into effect.31 In 1869, a law to 
regulate Ottoman citizenship was promulgated, but as Üstel stresses, this only regulates 
the preconditions to win or lose Ottoman nationality and does not say anything to make 
one belong to any nation or people.32 In 1876, the Ottoman basic law, Kanun-i Esasi, 
was put into effect, but as Akşin Somel argues, definition of citizenship can perhaps 
better be identified with 1856, the Reforn Edict.33 
 The period in which the Ottoman citizen was created can be taken as 1908, the 
II. Constitution, or earlier. Within the date 1908, two things should be addressed: 1908 
period as the most lively and politically pluralistic era of Turkish history till then, as 
Aykut Kansu, Gökhan Kaya and Fevzi Demir argue, and the importance the Ottoman 
state gives to the creation and raising of citizen, as Füsun Üstel argues. Within 1856, the 
Reform Edict where for the first time the definition of Ottoman citizenship was properly 
made should be emphasized. While discussing the date 1908,  I will do my best in order 
not to fall into the trap of fetishizing 1908 or any Ottoman period, which I will also 
discuss below.        
 As Aykut Kansu, Gökhan Kaya and Fevzi Demir all state, 1908 is the period 
which for the first time brought political pluralism and liberalism to Turkish political 
life.34 With election campaigns and somewhat free and regular elections, it marks the 
                                                
29 Zafer Toprak, Türkiye'de Popülizm, p. 15-16; Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi, p. 124. 
30 Füsun Üstel, “II. Meşrutiyet ve Vatandaş'ın “İcad”ı,” as in Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde, p. 25. This is 
an article published first in İletişim's book Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Tanzimat ve 
Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, with the same title. Üstel took it to her book Makbul Vatandaş'ın Peşinde, with 
some additions.  
31 Ibid, p. 25. 
32 Ibid, p. 26. 
33 Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839-1913),” as in Tanzimat ve 
Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, p. 92-96. 
34 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 1, 3 and 368; Gökhan Kaya, Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası, p. 15, 17, 18; 
Fevzi Demir, Osmanlı Devleti'nde II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri  pp. 13-14 and 
347.   
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period of Turkish history which saw political liberalism. Kansu takes his assertion to the 
level of claiming that “Revolution of 1908 literally brought the end of the empire” and 
“sought to settle a liberal, democratic regime.”35 Demir argues that the II. Constitution 
started the politicization process, thereby opening the period of charities, political 
parties and pluralism.36 Kaya likewise asserts that the liberal atmosphere emerging with 
the II. Constitution and the charities, communities and the political parties created the 
modern Ottoman political space. 
 As for the creation of citizen, we can talk about 1856 – as Akşin Somel does – or 
the II. Constitution (1908), as Füsun Üstel does. As Füsun Üstel argues, Malumat-ı 
Medeniyye, (which can perhaps be translated as “Knowledge of Civilization”) was a 
course studied in Ottoman schools whose main concern was the creation of Ottoman 
citizenship. The ministry of education of the cabinet of Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP), Emrullah Efendi, was engaged with the creation of citizen fitting the 
regime of Meşrutiyyet (Constitution) and he wanted the lessons to be based on taming 
and educating the children. The course Malumat-ı Medeniyye had an important role in 
raising the citizen the new regime desired. Üstel and Kansu also identify the period of 
II. Constitution as the transition from subject (tebaa) to citizen,37 which I will touch 
upon below as the main point of my criticism while discussing transition from subject to 
citizen. Finally, Akşin Somel identifies the emergence of Ottoman citizenship as 1856, 
with the Reform Edict.38 As for the distinction between 1856 and 1908, I have my 
doubts, but perhaps we can identify the start of the process of transition from subject to 
citizen with 1856, although the people of 1908 had more rights then that of 1856.  
 Let me now wrap all the arguments I have talked about so far, and talk about 
what they mean and how, if any of them, lack factual basis. While doing this, I will 
refer to an article of Cemil Koçak, in relation to the meaning of 1908. As it can be seen, 
I am talking about two group of historians and while the former identify transition from 
subject to citizen with 1923, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, the latter do this 
with 1908, the II. Constitution, or earlier. Let me now discuss both groups and state my 
own opinion. 
 As I've said before, identifying Ottoman Empire as theocratic and thereby saying 
                                                
35 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. XV. 
36 Fevzi Demir, Osmanlı Devleti'nde II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri, p. 14.  
37 Füsun Üstel, “II. Meşrutiyet ve “Vatandaş”ın İcadı,” p. 319; Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 366. 
38 Akşin Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlıcılık Düşüncesi (1839-1913),” as in Tanzimat ve 
Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, p. 92-96. 
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that the Turkish Republic means transition from subject to citizen lacks factual basis. 
The six-hundred-year-period of the Ottoman Empire was not shaped by the same 
characteristics; even the first 300-400 years often referred to as “the classical age” can 
not be identified with the same characteristics.39 Ottoman Empire entered a period of 
modernization40 in the 2nd half of the 19th century which culminates with the period of 
1908. As all Aykut Kansu, Gökhan Kaya, Füsun Üstel and Fevzi Demir argue, limitedly 
free and fair elections41, constitution, election campaigns and school courses (and course 
books) where the definition of Ottoman citizen is properly made, corresponds better to 
the creation of citizenship than 1923, proclamation of the Turkish Republic.  
 When we bring together all these, the conclusion we can reach is that, while it is 
debatable when the Ottoman citizen emerged, it doesn't look plausible to argue that 
Turkish Republic marked the transition from subject to citizen. For this argument to 
make sense, citizens of the Early Republic should have some rights that the Ottoman 
citizens lacked. In this regard, perhaps it can be argued that women obtained their rights 
to vote between 1930-1934, but it should be questioned what it means to vote when 
there is only one party.  
 It should also be kept in mind that, when the exponents of single-party assert that 
Turkish Republic meant transition from subject to citizen, they do not show cogent 
grounding for their claim. However, the ones who identify this transition with some 
time between 1839-1912, show certain concepts, laws or rights for their argument. It is 
not very surprising that while Toktamış Ateş only argues that Turkish Republic means 
transition from subject to citizen, Akşin Somel discusses the Reform Edict of 1856 and 
Şükrü Hanioğlu cites elections, polyphonic media or political movements. This is what I 
conclude: What is done in Kemalist historiography42 is - in the words of Mete Tunçay43 
                                                
39 Fevzi Demir, Osmanlı Devleti'nde II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi Meclis-i Mebusan Seçimleri, p. 19 
40 While there is more or less an agreement within the Turkish historiography that the Ottoman Empire 
started to Westernize and modernize in the 19th century, Şükrü Hanioğlu offers a different approach. 
In A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Hanioglu challenges this paradigm of Westernization 
and offers a wider perspective characterized by an Ottoman response to modernity and attempts of 
Ottoman Empire to gain the control of center.   
41 The 1908 elections were not free and fair in the sense we know today. For instance, women could not 
vote. Nor males who did not pay any tax, too. For the characteristics of the 1908 elections, see Fevzi 
Demir, Ibid, pp. 49-57. 
42 The term “Kemalist historiography” is not yet a term in Turkish, but “Kemalist” is. I described the 
way history is presented from a Kemalist point of view as “Kemalist historiography.” I hope to coin 
this term with my future academic works.  
      I should also add that, I categorize the historians who champion Ataturk's rule and argue that the 
single-party period was a necessity, as “single-party advocates/proponents/exponents.”    
43 Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması, (from now on, TC'de Tek-
Parti) p. 1   
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and Cemil Koçak44 - producing theories without basing them on facts. We can perhaps 
come up with several other theories to suggest that Turkish Republic meant transition 
from subject to citizen, but unless they are corroborated with factual evidence, theories 
by themselves are not very convincing. 
 One thing I feel the need to emphasize is the trap of fetishizing the period of 
1908 and I have something to say about this. In an article, Cemil Koçak states that lack 
of democracy today makes the historians look for its foundations in yesterday, and that 
Aykut Kansu's identifying the period of 1908 with liberal democracy is a product of this 
problem. Koçak argues that since the people we often identify with liberal democratic 
ideas did not have the chance of coming to power and that we do this identification 
based on their statements, we can not certainly know whether they would remain 
democratic if they came to power.45  
 I might agree with Cemil Koçak in this matter to some extent. In fact, if we can 
make a claim like this to point out the dangers of fetishizing political figures and 
parties, the study this danger best corresponds to will be Gökhan Kaya's published Ph. 
D., Osmanlı Demokrat Fırkası. Although Kaya himself states that this party never had 
the chance of coming to power and that they joined the Hürriyet ve İtilaf (HİF) Party 
later, he nevertheless identifies the party with the most positive, liberal democratic 
ideas, based on their statements and the documents they left behind. Koçak's article 
which criticizes seeking democrats in the near history would well suit this study, for we 
do not know what would have come out of this party if it had ever obtained the chance 
of coming to power.   
 Still, all the examples I've discussed above pertaining to 1908 or earlier  should 
be enough for me in arguing against the Kemalist theses that the Turkish Republic 
means transition from subject to citizen. Whether 1908 was a revolution and whether it 
started capitalist accumulation in Turkey, as Kansu claims46 is outside my interest for 
the time being. As both Ayşe Hür47 and Emre Kongar48 objects, 1908 might not be a 
people's movement and that the motive for it might not be the rights of citizens and 
individual liberty; it can be argued that “Revolution of 1908” was a fray among the ruler 
elites. Likewise, whether the Ottoman Democratic Party was really liberal democratic 
                                                
44 Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 652. 
45 Cemil Koçak, “Tarih Çalışmalarında Yeni Bir Eğilim: Siyasi Tarihimizde Demokrat Aramak” as in 
Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir, p. 539-544. 
46 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 376. 
47 Ayşe Hür, “1908 Devrim mi Darbe mi,” as in Öteki Tarih I, p. 106.  
48 Emre Kongar, cited in Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 29. 
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and whether they would remain democratic if they had ever come to power does not 
quite interest me. To argue against the Kemalist assumption that Turkish Republic 
created citizen from subject, a more or less politically plural 1908 atmosphere and some 
proof that Turkish citizen was defined properly in Ottoman course books, is I think 
enough, and as a single-party proponent like Zafer Toprak points out, the parliament of 
1908 would be “counted as an important step towards pluralist, parliamentary life.49 
When we admit that Turkey entered a modernization period in the 19th century, and that 
she had already witnessed a political pluralism in 1920's,50 putting forward and 
defending the above mentioned Kemalist theses become utterly difficult.    
 I should add a few words about the Kemalist argument that Turkish Republic 
created citizen from subject, and I will come back to this point in the very end of this 
work as well. With their vast knowledge of the Ottoman society structure, figures like 
Emre Kongar or Toktamış Ateş themselves probably do know that if this transition ever 
existed, it was during the late Ottoman period. But their over attachment to Kemalism 
which at times manifests itself in the shape of a cult of leadership51 - argued by Kansu 
as “the psychology of worshipping a hero” bringing with itself “the assertion that the 
existence of Turkey today depends on the Father”52 might be preventing them from 
conceding this. What they do is to come up with hypothesis without taking into 
consideration the facts, an approach criticized by Mete Tunçay and Cemil Koçak.53 
After all, they are trying to justify an authoritarian -if not totalitarian- period, and they 
need to find excuses. The reason why Toktamış Ateş, in almost all his works, talks 
about this so-called transition from subject to citizen is that he needs to make an 
apology for the single-party authoritarianism, which he champions. And he never 
explains how this transition ever took place in 1923, which he can not. 
 
                                                
49 Zafer Toprak, Türkiye'de Popülizm, p. 16. 
50 Cemil Koçak, Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası (from now on, Serbest Cumhuriyet 
Fırkası), p. 641 and 645. 
51 Toktamış Ateş, as in Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz, p. 2 and 112. Here, Ateş talks about how we are 
beholden to Atatürk, one time giving Halide Edip as example.    
52 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 15. 
53 Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 652; Mete Tunçay, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek-Parti 
Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (from now on, TC'nde Tek Parti), p. 1.   
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II.	  Interwar	  Europe	  Authoritarianism	  
  
I started my work with a basic question: What is the defense of single-party 
based on, and why should it be abandoned? The first sub-thesis of defense of single-
party I indicated was the question of transition from subject to citizen, and my second 
sub-title is interwar Europe authoritarianism. As I will demonstrate its examples below, 
the assumption that interwar European states were characterised by totalitarian and/or 
fascist regimes makes one of the backgrounds of the claims that justify single-party 
regime of Turkey. 
 Roughly speaking, the argument goes as follows: Interwar Europe saw the rising 
of many authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, mainly the Nazi Germany of Hitler and 
the fascist Italy of Mussolini. Apart from these obvious examples; Spain of Franco, 
Greece of Metaxas, Salazar of Portugal and Pilsudski of Poland can be counted among 
many dictatorships. At a time like this, Turkey had a relatively softer regime, with a 
limited amount of liberty. When we evaluate  Atatürk's single-party regime with respect 
to the values of her time, single-party rule is (should be) acceptable. 
 I should say now that there are two obvious problems with he above-mentioned 
argument, and I will utter them when I am done with citing examples. This claim that 
interwar Europe witnessed the rising of totalitarian regimes so the single-party regime 
of Turkey should be accepted natural has various examples in the Kemalist literature. 
The era is often referred to as the “Europe of 1920's and 1930's” and the arguments can 
show variety. Let me explain by citing the examples. 
 The names I will refer to are İlber Ortaylı, Toktamış Ateş, Hakkı Uyar, Sina 
Akşin, Nurşen Mazıcı, Ergün Aybars and Zafer Toprak. Ortaylı asserts there was no 
democracy in the European continent, particularly in the essential names of today's 
European Union. Democracy was “degenerated and dysfunctional” in France; it is out 
of question in Poland and Hungary; it is causing street fights in Austria and it is 
“obvious where it is going in Germany” (meaning the rise of Hitler's Nazi party, U. D.). 
In addition, England was outside of the continent, as it is today, and so was 
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Scandinavia.54 
 According to Toktamış Ateş, it is wrong to evaluate the world of 1920's and 
1930's with the values of 2000's. “Interwar period was a time all around the world, 
especially in Europe where  totalitarian winds blew. With respect to both human rights 
and liberties, the Turkey of those times was one of the leading states of Europe.” Ateş 
goes on to give the examples of Belgium and France as countries whose women 
obtained their rights after Turkey, and finally mentions some 200 professors who fled 
Nazi Germany to come to Turkey, as “something to think about.”55 
 Sina Akşin is another figure who approaches to the matter from the same angle 
as Toktamış Ateş, citing the same example. “Atatürk regime,” Akşin claims, “was 
above the level of European democracy.” Akşin, like Ateş, gives the example of (this 
time 142) university professors who accepted to come to Turkey to live and work for a 
long time, and says that “there is no reason to think that these people were desperate or 
stupid enough to move from a dictatorship to another one,”56 implying that the Turkey 
of that time was not a dictatorship. Akşin makes his same argument in another work, 
too. Saying that in post World War I Europe authoritarian and totalitarian regimes were 
extremely normal, and that the single-party rule in Turkey was more democratic than 
many other European countries, Akşin gives the examples of Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and the Soviet Union. He states that maybe Atatürk's single-party regime could 
be titled as dictatorship, but since it was not totalitarian and did not bear rampant anti-
Semitism, it was lesser of the two evil.57 
 The last three examples I will talk about in this interwar Europe authoritarianism 
are Nurşen Mazıcı, Ergün Aybars and Zafer Toprak. Mazıcı gives the examples of 
French and Switzerland as the only republic regimes in Europe in the end of World War 
I. Stressing that the republic regimes later turned into totalitarian and militarist ones, 
Mazıcı says that “Turkey at least was successful in protecting a softer republic.”58 
Toprak likewise identifies the period between 1914-1945 as the “dark ages of Europe” 
(perhaps giving reference to Mazower's book titled as The Dark Continent) and claims 
that trying to understand the single-party of Atatürk is impossible when we ignore this. 
                                                
54 İlber Ortaylı, Yakın Tarihin Gerçekleri, p. 100. 
55 Toktamış Ateş, “Kemalizm ve Özgünlüğü,” as in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm, p. 
322. 
56 Sina Akşin, Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, p. 225. 
57 Sina Akşin, “Atatürk Döneminde Demokrasi,” cited in Hakkı Uyar, Tek Parti Dönemi ve Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi (from now on, Tek-Parti Dönemi), p. 92-93. 
58 Nurşen Mazıcı, Tek-Parti Dönemi, p. 10. 
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Toprak also talks about head skull measurements conducted during the 1930's in 
Turkey-in fact this is the main purpose of him to write the book and I will come back to 
that part, in the end of this chapter. Finally, Ergün Aybars, too, like Toprak, identifies 
the period between 1918-1940 as the “age of totalitarian states” and stresses that 
“Turkish Republic will make its preference in such an atmosphere.59    
 As I've said in the previous paragraphs, the arguments show resemblance. The 
view of all the above-mentioned historians is that interwar Europe was characterized by 
authoritarian/ totalitarian regimes and at a time like this, Turkey had a softer regime. 
The countries that are most cited are Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. To make 
their arguments more valid, Toktamış Ateş and Sina Akşin give the examples of some 
150-200 university lecturers who preferred to come to Turkey after they fled the Nazi 
Germany. 
 The first and foremost thing that should be uttered about interwar Europe 
authoritarianism is that, the Europe of 1920's was not characterized by authoritarian or 
totalitarian/fascist regimes. As we know very well, the rise of totalitarian Europe 
corresponds to the 1930's, and not 1920's. Since it is impossible for erudite historians 
like İlber Ortaylı not to know this, what I will suggest is that the desire to defend single-
party regime of Turkey prompts historians like Ortaylı to distort history.  
 There are more than enough sources to have a general look into the regimes of 
interwar Europe. The names I will refer to are Mark Mazower, Eric Hobsbawm, 
Norman Davies, J. M. Roberts, Michael Mann and Cemil Koçak. Mazower states that 
when World War I was over, democracy was in its apogee.60 While Mazower states that 
the number of republics in Europe at the beginning of World War I was 3, and in the 
end 13;61 Davies states that in the beginning (of World War I) there were 19 monarchies 
and 3 republics, in the end 14 monarchies and 16 republics.62 Likewise, Hobsbawm puts 
forward that in 1920, there were “35 or maybe more” constitutional elected 
governments all around the globe.63 According to Şükrü Hanioğlu, 28 out of 32 regimes 
in 192364 and according to Michael Mann, “all but one of its twenty-eight states...in late 
                                                
59 Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik Demokrasi, p. 185. 
60 Mark Mazower, Karanlık Kıta: Avrupa'nın 20. Yüzyılı, p. XII. Mazower also states that 20 years later, 
democracy was facing death, which I will talk about soon.  
61 İbid, p. 2.  
62 Norman Davies, Europe: A History, p. 943.  
63 Eric Hobsbawm, Kısa 20. Yüzyıl: Aşırılıklar Çağı (from now on Kısa 20. Yüzyıl), p. 147. 
64 Şükrü Hanioğlu, “Dönemin koşulları göz önüne alınırsa” Sabah 4 Dec 2011.  
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1920” (the deviant one being the Soviet Union)65 in Europe are parliamentary 
democracies. Finally, Cemil Koçak states that in 1920, there were only two countries in 
Europe without democracy, and in 1940, there were only two with democracy.66 
  The above-mentioned information makes it clear that in 1920's, Europe was not 
characterized by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes (the numbers may, and do, differ 
from source to source; what is clear I think is that post World War I period witnessed 
the rise of democracies, not totalitarian regimes). However, we should also make clear 
that this democratic triumph of Europe was very short lived; that is to say when we 
come to the mid 1930's, democracies had been vanquished by fascist or totalitarian 
regimes. At this point, again I see it useful to refer to the above-mentioned names. 
Mazower states that in 1918, democracy was triumphant but adds that 20 years later, it 
had almost disappeared.67 He adds that in the end of 1930's, full support for democracy 
was in decline all around Europe.68 Hobsbawm and Davies have similar evaluations for 
the future of democracy in Europe. Hobsbawm states that 35 or more regimes in 1920 
were elected governments, but he adds that when we come to 1938 -only one year 
before World War II- the number was at most 17.69 Likewise, Davies concludes that 
“democratic revolution soon proved illusory.”70 
 The above-mentioned information speaks for itself and hardly needs further 
clarification. The early years of interwar Europe did not witness the rise of totalitarian 
regimes, as suggested by almost all Kemalist names I uttered above. On the contrary, 
what we saw in 1919 in Paris Conference was, the triumph of democracy. To quote 
from Mazower, it was “a generation of democracy ranging from the Baltic to the 
Balkans, passing through Germany and Poland.”71 It is true that Europe “saw liberal 
democracies falling prey to dictatorships,”72 but this was in the 1930's, when Turkey had 
already transferred to the single-party regime, which is the core of my first criticism to 
the interwar Europe authoritarianism argument.  
 The second point I want to make is that, even if in 1920's, Europe had seen the 
rise of totalitarian regimes, this can not be used as an excuse for transferring to single-
party regime; it can only serve as part of apologist historiography. Justifying Turkey's 
                                                
65   Michael Mann, Fascists, p. 37. 
66   Cemil Koçak, “Türkiye Avrupa'daki 4'üncü tek-parti diktatorluguydu,” Star, 2 March 2013.  
67   Mark Mazower, Karanlık Kıta: Avrupa'nın Yirminci Yüzyılı, p. 4. 
68  Ibid, p. 25.  
69  Eric Hobsbawm, Kısa 20. Yüzyıl, p. 148.  
70  Norman Davies, Europe: A History p. 943.  
71  Mark Mazower, Karanlık Kıta: Avrupa'nın Yirminci Yüzyılı, p. 2. 
72  Norman Davies, Europe: A History, p. 943.   
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single-party regime based on   the totalitarian regimes of interwar Europe would mean 
to forget that the regimes Turkey claims to have been influenced by, are considered 
infamuous and loathsome. What the proponents of single-party refuse to see is that bad 
examples can not be accepted as precedent.  
 I want to make this point more clear, for whenever the authoritarian regime of 
Turkey is discussed, the final word is that the Europe of 1920's and 30's were mired in 
totalitarianism, so it was normal for Turkey to take these states as example. This is 
equal to an Italian historian's arguing that Mussolini's regime should be accepted, 
considering that it was influenced by Hitler! This is also equal to a German historian 
claiming that Germany's totalitarian tendencies should not be questioned, for they were 
influenced by the winds blowing from Italy. In addition, this issue of authoritarianism is 
not a result of the circumstances; it looks more like a preference. Therefore, saying that 
the conditions of the time were not suitable, like İlber Ortaylı does, is utterly 
problematic.  
 The postulation that interwar Europe saw the rising of totalitarian regimes also 
brings with itself the premise that Turkey transferred to the single-party regime after 
other European states, which is based on false information. Hitler comes to power in 
Germany in 1933, 8 years after Turkey transferred to single-party regime. Likewise, 
Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, Norway and Czechoslovakia all fall prey to 
authoritarianism after Turkey.73  As Cemil Koçak puts forward, Turkey is the fourth 
country to turn into the single-party regime, after Russia (1917), Hungary (1920) and 
Italy (1922) respectively.74 If there is any mentioning of influence, it is not that Turkey 
was influenced by the authoritarian regimes, but perhaps it should be vice versa.   
 It is almost always uttered that Turkey was influenced by the totalitarian 
interwar regimes, and the two examples always uttered are Italy and Germany. Hitler's 
statement which we can only read in Falih Rıfkı Atay's book Çankaya -and only in the 
original one since it was censored in the later editions- speaks for itself: Ataturk's first 
pupil is Mussolini, I am the second one.75  
Here, I am pleading the readers not to make comparisons with Hitler's III. Reich and the 
                                                
73  Nancy Bermeo, Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of 
Democracy, p. 21. 
74  Cemil Koçak counts these 3 countries in historical order and states that, Turkey became the 4th single  
party-state, after Russia, Italy and Hungary respectively. But since he states that Hungary was turned 
into single-party in 1920 and Italy in 1922, the order should be Russia, Hungary and Italy, 
respectively.      
75   Falih Rıfkı Atay, Çankaya, p. 205. 
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Kemalist Republic, which would be preposterous, but rather to ponder: If Hitler himself 
is claiming that Ataturk's first student is Mussolini, and himself the second, than Turkey 
could not have been influenced by Germany or Italy. Also, knowing that Italy banned 
all opposition and cemented the single-party rule in 1926, Germany in 1933 and Turkey 
in 1925, I think it seems obvious who was influenced by whom.             
 The question of some 142 or 200 university lecturers coming to Turkey to flee 
Nazi Germany will not help us in justifying Turkey's single-party regime or claiming 
that it “was above the level of European democracy,” as Sina Akşin does.76 Since at that 
time, some European countries -mainly Germany- had eradicated democracy at a level 
never witnessed before, Turkey's “protecting a softer regime,” as Nurşen Mazıcı 
argues,77 can not be an excuse for legitimization. Why the university lecturers left Nazi 
Germany to come to Turkey seems obvious: To save their lives! Therefore, Akşin's 
suggesting that these people can not be stupid enough to move from a dictatorship to 
another one78 seems utterly problematic. If one is moving from a dictatorship that aims 
to burn him after choking with gas to another one that does nothing to destroy him but 
that does not give him much right, I think one would immediately accept it! Not 
establishing death camps or destroying all the opposition with utmost violence can not 
be an excuse for justifying singe-party rule. Nevertheless, I should reiterate that saying 
that Turkey's single-party regime can not be justified based on Nazi Germany should on 
no account lead to making comparisons between III. Reich and Kemalist Turkey.79  
 At this point, I would like to move the argument to a different level, with 
reference to a study by Zafer Toprak. In his book, Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve 
Antropoloji, Toprak talks about the physical anthropology studies conducted during the 
interwar period in detail, and claims a few times that Turkey was affected by this 
atmosphere. Toprak also gives the example of head skull measurements meticulously 
conducted by Afet İnan and titles them as the “biggest anthropological survey.”80 I 
would like to touch upon this claim of Toprak closely, for I believe it constitutes a 
                                                
76   Sina Akşin, Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, p. 225.  
77  Nurşen Mazıcı, Tek-Parti Dönemi, p. 10. 
78  Sina Akşin, Kısa Türkiye Tarihi, p. 225. 
79 While it is not plausible to draw parallels between the Nazi Germany and Kemalist Turkey; Soviet 
Russia and Fascist Italy might offer better examples for comparison, and Stefan Plaggenborg titles his 
most recent study as Ordnung und Gewalt: Kemalismus-Sozialismus-Faschismus. In addition, Stefan 
Ihrig, who argues that the Nazis were influenced by Atatürk, titles his work as Atatürk in the Nazi 
Imagination.     
80  Zafer Toprak, Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji (from now on Cumhuriyet ve 
Antropoloji), p. 99.   
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quintessential example of apologist historiography.  
 Zafer Toprak states in his work that “the interwar period is maybe the darkest 
decades of all history,”81 a statement with which most people would pretty much agree. 
The problem is that, he goes on to say that “the Republican Turkey is emerging in such 
an atmosphere,”82 starting to make grounds for his apologetic arguments. After that, he 
is counting the various so-called anthropological studies conducted during the interwar 
period -needless to say all of which were racist- and argues that Turkey was influenced 
by the spirit of the time. 
 An interesting point made by Toprak is that the anthropological studies 
conducted during Turkey's single-party regime was done to prove to the world that 
Turkish people were not part of the yellow race. Toprak's argument goes as follows: 
European nations identified Turkey as the yellow race,83 which was a racist attitude. We 
however, proved them wrong by demonstrating that we are not from the yellow race 
(which Toprak somehow does not identify as racism). European peoples thought 
Turkish people were dolichocephalic, but we, thanks to our anthropological studies, 
proved that we too, like the Europeans, were brachycephalic.  
 This is another case where the Kemalist historiography is trying to legitimize its 
wrongdoing by exemplifying another wrongdoing. Mind you, Zafer Toprak knows that 
what Europeans did was racism, and therefore he says that “the antidote of 
anthropological mistakes, was again anthropology.”84 This is equal to saying the 
antidote of racism was again racism, or as perfectly  stated by Şükrü Hanioğlu, “our 
racism was good.”85 
 Zafer Toprak constructs all his book on the premise that if some so-called 
anthropological studies identify Turkey from the yellow race, then another study 
claiming that Turkey does not belong to the yellow race should be acceptable. 
Unfortunately, these actions are equally racist. A bad example can not be justified by 
pointing out a worse example. No matter how much Toprak does his best to prove that 
the question of racism is not ethnic, and that it bears an anthropological quality by 
saying that “an inclusive, not exclusive question of racism is dominating all the single-
                                                
81  Ibid, p. 13.  
82   Ibid. p. 13  
83  Ibid, p. 72. 
84  Ibid, p.13. 
85  Şükrü Hanioğlu, “En asil duygunun tarihçiliğinden apolojetik tarihyazımına,” Sabah, 1 July 2012.   
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party period”,86 it is to no avail, and it does not change the fact that single-party regime 
of Turkey saw racist actions. 
 At this point, it might be judicious to take into account that Atatürk declared in 
1930 that the landscape of Turkey was like that of a dictatorship, and it was obvious that 
he was not pleased with this. This is suggestive because if in 1930, European nations 
one by one had fallen prey to  totalitarianism, Atatürk would probably not say that “the 
landscape of today is more or less a dictatorship and that I do not want to leave an 
institution of despotism after I die.”87 It is lack of democracy in Turkey that makes 
Europeans disrespect and denigrate Turkey,88 and it is the same lack of democracy 
which prompts Atatürk to take a step to establish a new political party, albeit a 
controlled one. Both Europeans and Turkish people at that time are perfectly aware that 
the political fashion in Europe in 1930 is not authoritarianism.        
 I should repeat once more what I've been discussing in this chapter. The 
argument that Turkey's leaning on single-party regime can be justified considering the 
authoritarian or totalitarian characteristics of interwar Europe is not cogent for two 
reasons. The first is that unlike conventional assumptions, Europe of 1920's was not 
dominated by authoritarian regimes; most of those regimes rose in 1930's. Although this 
is as plain as day, it is suggestive that almost all Kemalist theses use this excuse for 
single-party justification. Accordingly, Turkey which was turned into a single-party 
regime in 1925 can not have been influenced by totalitarian states. The second is that, 
even if this had happened like this -meaning if in 1920's authoritarian regimes had risen 
in Europe- this should not justify Turkey's single-party regime, because the examples all 
the world remembers with hate and disgust should not be cited as examples that 
influenced Turkey. The first point is historically, the second one is morally problematic.        
                
                                                
86  Zafer Toprak, Cumhuriyet ve Antropoloji, p. 15. 
87   Mete Tunçay, TC'nde Tek-Parti, p. 254. 
88   Here, I will give two important examples: An often narrated anectode within the foundation of Free 
Republican Party is that when Kazım Paşa, head of Turkish parliament tries to elucidate in Vienna to a 
European journalist that Turkey has only one party and that it is normal because of Turkey's unique 
conditions, the journalist mocks him the next day in his column and finds it stupid that a Turkish is 
trying to teach parliament lesson in the middle of Europe to the Europeans. (Cited in Mete Tunçay, 
TC'nde Tek-Parti, p. 248; Ayşe Hür, Öteki Tarih III, pp. 47-48).  
       Another name that is often referred to is Joseph McGrew, American ambassador in Turkey in 
1930. Mcgrew writes that Atatürk gradually reached the conclusion that single-party system, when 
compared with Europe, is a token of abasement. Mcgrew also mentions the European journalists who 
had recently talked about “Turkish dictatorship as formally Western but de facto Eastern,” and states 
that Atatürk did not like this at all (Cited in Mete Tunçay, TC'nde Tek-Parti, pp. 247-248; Ayşe Hür, 
Öteki Tarih III, p. 47). 
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III.	  Modernization	  Theory	  and	  Unique/Unfavorable	  Conditions	  of	  Turkey	  
   
 This will be the longest, and arguably the most important chapter of this thesis 
for I will address an important part of the assertions put forward to justify single-party 
regime of Turkey.  While the material in the first two chapters are easy to categorize, I 
can not say the same thing for this one. The reason is that the issues raised in this 
chapter are often intertwined and used interchangeably. Let me elucidate this point. The 
remaining premises to justify single-party period are as follows: a) Turkey had her 
unique conditions which entailed a single-party regime; b) In a country where the socio-
economic conditions are not favorable, there can not be democracy (pluralism); c) 
Republican People Party (CHP)89 established by Atatürk is kind of a tutelage party 
which prepared the preconditions of a democratic regime; and d) Democracy was the 
aim to reach in the long run.  
 I will deal with all the premises above in this chapter jointly, and not one by one, 
because they tend to intertwine with each other. Let me give a couple of examples and 
then go on with the summary of the premises. There will be some cases where Turkey's 
unique conditions will be voiced along with her low socio-economic level, so it will be 
easier to deal with them. Also, since teleologic historiography is related with Turkey's 
“unique” conditions, tutelage party debate and German Sonderweg, it would not be the 
best idea to treat each of them separately, under different titles in different chapters.  
  Before beginning this chapter, I would once more like to summarize my aim in 
this work and  what I have done so far. I am trying to disprove the premise that the early 
years of Turkish Republic entailed a single-party system. In doing so, I am referring to 
                                                
89   The full name of the party is Republican People Party, and is usually abbreviated as RPP in the 
English literature about Turkish history. The reason for my predilection of “CHP” in this thesis is that 
this is a study about Turkish history, and will mostly be read by the Turkish audience. Likewise, 
Progressive Republican Party will be addressed as TPCF, and Free Republican Party as SCF, with 
their Turkish abbreviations. 
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the assertions of historians within the Kemalist historiography and so far, I have dealt 
with two of them: That Turkish Rebuplic meant transition from subject to citizen, and 
that since inter-war European states had authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, it was natural 
for Turkey to follow suit. The third premise I will question -and hopefully confute- is 
that Turkey's unique conditions entailed a single-party regime and/or put obstacle for 
the creation of a true democracy. While talking about Turkey's “unique conditions,” I 
will incorporate the modernization theory, debate about tutelage party, teleologic 
discussions, and to compare Turkey with Germany, I will raise an important debate 
from Western historiography: Sonderweg (that like Turkey, Germany had her unique 
conditions which produced authoritarianism).     
Modernist	  and	  Kemalist	  Paradigms:	  Unique	  Conditions	  and	  Sonderweg	  
 I will start with the modernization theory and preconditions of democracy, and 
in doing so, the name I will resort to will be Levent Köker, though he merely refers to 
this paradigm without supporting it. The modernization theory envisages two kinds of 
societies (traditional and modern), and to be able to observe how the single-party period 
is justified by historians, it is imperative to understand their premises, which assert that 
Turkish Republic meant transition from a traditional society (meaning Ottoman Empire) 
to a modern one, so it was imperative to go through a transition stage.   
 The modernization theory, put forward by the Western social scientists for the 
non-Western societies roughly goes as follows: i) There is a distinction between 
traditional and modern societies. ii) Democracies can only exist in the modern ones, and 
for democracy, certain level of economic and cultural conditions are necessary. iii) The 
modern society is characterized by capitalism and industry. iv) Evolution from the 
traditional to the modern society takes stages, and a transition stage might be necessary 
which may be characterized by coercion v) Every society will pass from the same 
stages, despite their certain idiosyncrasies. vi) Modernization is an irreversible process 
and a society to reach a certain level in terms of urbanization, industrialization and 
literacy will not experience previous stages again.90  
 It might be like spoiling the end of a movie, but I should say now that historians 
I have referred to so far who justify single-party period of Turkey will exploit this 
paradigm to the full extent, duly identifying Ottoman society as a traditional one, the 
democratic Turkey Atatürk desired to create a modern one, Atatürk revolutions about 
attire, time and measure units, script revolution etc. as agents of modernization and the 
                                                
90   Levent Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, p. 35 and 52.  
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single-party period as the transition stage. No doubt the debate of subject to citizen I've 
discussed in the first chapter will fit into this theory, too. What an invaluable paradigm 
for exponents of single-party! 
 From the modernization theory, let me skip to Turkey's so-called 
unique/unfavorable conditions and then discuss how they relate. The figures I will resort 
to while discussing Turkey's “uniqueness” and low socio-economic conditions will be 
Anıl Çeçen, İlber Ortaylı, Ergün Aybars, Bernard Lewis, Halil İnalcık, Ahmet Taner 
Kışlalı, Toktamış Ateş, and Emre Kongar, respectively. I should first summarize the 
assertions of these distinguished names: Because Turkey had its unique conditions such 
as low socio-economic level and an empire background, there was no way for her to 
experience democracy. The facts that she came out of a war conducted under tough 
conditions and lack of an industrial (and/or bourgeoisie) revolution also played a key 
role in necessitating the rule of the single-party regime.  
 The figure that talks about Turkey's uniqueness -almost with an obsessed 
manner- is Anıl Çeçen. In his work, 100 Soruda Kemalizm, Çeçen mentions these very 
words “our (or Turkey's ) unique conditions”  at least 10 times!91 It is bizarre and quite 
objectionable that Çeçen actually never  elucidates the meaning behind this “unique 
conditions of Turkey.” Quoting passages from Atatürk's certain speeches where he uses 
the phrase “we resemble us,” Çeçen again and again claims that Turkey had unique 
conditions. For instance Çeçen argues that the unique state of Kemalizm becomes 
prominent when it is combined with the unique conditions of the political setting.92 
Again, Çeçen asserts that Kemalizm can be evaluated based on Turkey's unique and 
other nations' non-unique conditions.93 Çeçen also claims while discussing Kemalist 
principles in general that, they were formulated based on Turkey's unique conditions 
while also exploiting -but not totally copying- other ideologies. While Çeçen 
emphasizes these uniqueness of Turkey at least 10 times, he doesn't make any attempt to 
substantiate his premise. 
 İlber Ortaylı is another historian who talks about Turkey's unique conditions. In 
his book Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yüzyılı -in the format of questions by İsmail Küçükkaya and 
answers- Ortaylı brings the word to Turkey's uniqueness twice, though not directly 
using these exact words in both of them. While Ortaylı claims that the secular model 
                                                
91   Anıl Çeçen, 100 Soruda Kemalizm, p. 21, 72, 76, 102, 114, 118, 121, 127, 128 and 184.  
92   Ibid, pp. 72.  
93   Ibid, pp. 118. 
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can not function in Turkey as it does in the West, he asserts that “we have to operate our 
unique (peculiar) model,” giving the example of Jewish state Israel.94 (When asked by 
Küçükkaya what that model is, Ortaylı fails to cite a cogent reason. Making a rather 
ambiguous statement about Moslem communities in Colonial countries, he argues that 
“it is not valid and that another model can not be established.”)   
 5 other names I will refer to pertaining to the uniqueness of Turkey are Ergün 
Aybars, Bernard Lewis, Halil İnalcık, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and Toktamış Ateş. In a 
chapter from the book of Bedri Baykam, Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına, Aybars 
mentions how in a previous conference he “talked about Turkey's unique conditions,” 
directly using these words. Talking about how Western states transferred to democracy, 
Aybars demonstrates the long process of democratization of the West. In doing this, he 
gives Western-world events such as the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution and 
French and American revolutions as examples. Citing Germany, Italy and Japan -the 
defeated nations of World War II who later transferred to democracy by means of 
international factors- Aybars tries to justify lack of democracy in single-party Turkey.95 
Likewise, Bernard Lewis -giving interview to Özer Ozankaya as part of his book Dünya 
Düşünürleri Gözüyle Atatürk ve Cumhuriyeti, talks about how hard it is to establish a 
democratic regime after a national war, emphasizing the fact that Ottoman State had 
been in struggle from 1908 onwards, though intermittently. Exemplifying Sweden, 
which did not go through the same afflictions that Turkey did, Lewis identifies Turkey's 
democracy experience as “radiant.”96 
 The identifications and assertions of Halil İnalcık, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı and 
Toktamış Ateş are not very different from that of the previous ones. Citing from the 
sociologist Eisenstadt, İnalcık states that the instability of Turkey's democracy can not 
be explained with military coups, development or unhealthy urbanization; rather, we 
can analyze it by the Kemalist regime springing from Turkey's unique conditions.97 
Kışlalı on the other hand, states in his newspaper article -like Kongar- that the 6 arrows 
of CHP were products of Turkey's conditions and that Kemalizm was the amalgamation 
of liberalism and socialism, in a country underdeveloped.98 Finally, Toktamış Ateş -
though not exactly using the same words as the ones above- argues that the amount of 
                                                
94  İlber Ortaylı, Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yüzyılı, pp. 144.   
95  Ergün Aybars, as in Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına, p. 59. 
96  Bernard Lewis, as in Dünya Düşünürleri Gözüyle Atatürk ve Cumhuriyeti, Özer Ozankaya, pp. 6-7. 
97   Halil İnalcık, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” Doğu-Batı, 29, as in Osmanlı ve Modern Türkiye, p. 197.  
98   Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “CHP'nin İdeolojisi ve Kemalizm,” Cumhuriyet, 2 Aug 1992, cited in Atatürk'e 
Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği p. 26. 
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blood split in the Turkish revolution is inconsiderably low, asserting that it is the result 
of the unique laws of a revolution process.99    
 The last figure I will refer to is Emre Kongar (and I saved him for the end on 
purpose to deal with him in detail) who in his book Atatürk directly uses the chapter 
subheading  “Turkey's Unique Conditions.” Analyzing it from a more or less class-
based perspective, Kongar  asserts that since the Western theories are not satisfactory in 
understanding Turkey, we should take into consideration Turkey's unique conditions, 
without completely rejecting Western theories. Kongar's analysis goes as follows: Since 
Turkey's Selcuki-Ottoman past is different from her Western counterparts, and since 
unlike the Western countries, Turkey did not go through an industrial revolution, the 
theories that comply to Western countries are not enough to understand Turkey. 
Exploiting the analyses of figures like Donald Blaisdell, Orhan Kurmuş and Rothar 
Rathmann, Kongar concludes that after Ottoman State became a semi-colonial country, 
adapting the Western methods became impossible. So today's Turkey -whose past was 
never experienced by societies of the West- has planes, but it is nevertheless backwards 
in technology100 (I will come back to this work and some categorizations of Kongar 
again in the end of this chapter). 
 Kongar makes a similar analysis in his work Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek, too, 
where he claims that the 6 arrows of CHP was designed based on the unique conditions 
of that day's Turkey, and that if one is to question the practices of the single-party, s/he 
should not ignore that those principles and practices took place in a society that neither 
underwent industrial revolution, nor consummated her democratic transition,101 which 
brings us to a similar example of historiography, Sonderweg. 
 Before going to the next phase, which will be about the so-called peculiar 
characteristic of German history, I shall summarize the above-mentioned points: Turkey 
could not develop a democratic regime like that of the west because of her unique 
(peculiar) conditions. Either because of the Ottoman past filled with afflictions or 
because of lack of bourgeoisie (or industry) revolution, Turkish state could not have 
followed the path of Western civilizations. Since Turkey does not resemble any other 
country, their conventional methods such as parliamentary democracies, elections etc. 
would not be favorable for her. Because of her peculiar conditions, Turkey had to go in 
                                                
99   Toktamış Ateş, as in Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına, p. 31. 
100  Emre Kongar, Atatürk p. 340.  
101  Emre Kongar, Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek, p. 216. 
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her own way. Turkey's unique conditions entailed the single-party rule. 
 From the uniqueness of Turkey, let me now come to the uniqueness of a Western 
society, Germany. Since Sonderweg, meaning special/unique path in German, (Sonder 
meaning special/unique/peculiar and weg meaning path/way/track) bears conspicuous 
resemblance to the “unique” conditions of Turkey, I believe it deserves some attention. 
Sonderweg is the title given to a standard historiography in Germany, claiming German 
superiority, or inferiority -depending on the time it is written- compared to other 
industrialized states, such as England and France. The works I will refer to for this 
Sonderweg debate will be Peculiarities of German History (including 2 long articles by 
Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn) and the review of that work by Zafer and Deniz 
Yenal. 
 The Sonderweg thesis -summarized in Yenal & Yenal, though they are not 
supporting it-  can be summarized as follows: i) Liberal democratic values are mostly 
the corollary of successful bourgeois revolutions. ii) A bourgeois revolution is one that 
will cause economic, social and cultural changes and which is fought by the bourgeoisie 
class against an aristocracy. iii) Successful bourgeoisie revolutions of this type did 
emerge in England and France. iv) Every society, at a certain stage of their 
development, will go through this kind of revolution. v) Unlike England and France, 
Germany did not go through a successful bourgeoisie revolution; and vi) The 
authoritarian regimes of Germany -not exclusively the Nazi Germany of Hitler- are 
results of this unsuccessful bourgeois revolution, and of Germany's aberration (unique 
conditions).102 
 I should say a couple of things about the above-mentioned Sonderweg argument. 
Until in 1989 -when Eley and Blackbourn published their separate essays questioning 
the validity and reliability of Germany's unsuccessful bourgeois revolution creating 
authoritarian rule- Sonderweg thesis was widely popular in the academic field. Perhaps 
its being held by both Marxist and liberal schools of thought might give a clue as to its 
efficiency.103 The interesting thing is that this Sonderweg thesis can be used both in the 
positive and negative context. Blackbourn and Eley observe that both in 1914 -in the 
eve of World War I- and during the Weimar years, Sonderweg was a positive notion 
whereas especially after 1945 -Germany's terrible defeat and destruction- historians' 
assessment of Sonderweg became negative. From this, I understand that the validity of 
                                                
102   Yenal & Yenal, “Alman Tarihinin Özgünlükleri Üzerine,” as in Toplum ve Bilim, 54-55, p. 106.  
103   David Blackbourn & Geoff Eley, Peculiarities of German History, p. 47. 
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Sonderweg is  measured by the ability of Wehrmacht in battles of Verdun, El Alamein 
or Stalingrad. 
 Let me now come to the discussion as to the uniqueness of Turkey and 
Germany, within the arguments of modernization theory. First of all, as Blackbourn and 
Eley emphasize, identifying a certain kind of development as aberration is highly 
problematic. This goes for both Turkish, and German cases. As Eley and Blackbourn 
state, “in order to have an aberration, it is clearly necessary to have a norm.”104 What is 
the common norm in German and Turkish cases: Modernization to be realized by an 
industrial and/or bourgeoisie revolution. Historians -Ralf Darendorf and Barington 
Moore in the case of Germany, and Emre Kongar in the case of Turkey- argue that these 
two states experienced an authoritarian regime because of lack of bourgeois revolution. 
While in the case of Turkey, the authoritarian single-party period is a justification for 
modernization, in the German case, it is an explanation for lack of proper 
modernization. The common denominator is that both cases are identified as being 
peculiar (unique) compared with their counterparts.  
 Another problem arises within the discussion of Turkish and German 
democracy. The modernization theory envisages that a successful bourgeois revolution 
will inevitably lead to liberal democratic values (Moore further argues that there can be 
no democracy without bourgeois revolution) but it is doubtful whether this is true. In 
fact Blackbourn and Eley who give England, France and even the USA as examples 
where this process did not necessarily operate like this,105 offer to “question the causal 
chain bourgeoisie-liberalism-parliamentation-democracy, as if these went naturally and 
somehow logically hand in hand.”106  
 Leaving the Sonderweg discussions for the moment -to come back later- let me 
now go on with the Turkish case. The problem with the Turkish case is that, both the 
pluralist periods between 1908-1912 and from 1919 onwards until the onset of the 
single-party regime, invite certain explanations as to the presence or lack of 
bourgeois/industrial revolution and/or socio-economic values. It is argued by all the 
following names -Anıl Çeçen, İlber Ortaylı, Emre Kongar, Ergün Aybars, Bernard 
Lewis, Halil İnalcık, Toktamış Ateş and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı- that low socio-economic 
conditions forestalled democracy. But if this were true, those two pluralist periods I've 
                                                
104   Ibid, p. 10 
105   Ibid, p. 15. 
106   Ibid, p. 16. 
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mentioned above could not have been experienced. If socio-economic conditions are a 
criteria for having democratic regime, the conditions in any year of the single-party 
regime were surely more favorable than either that of 1908 and of 1919. If anything, the 
conditions in 1908 were probably the worst of all, for the Ottoman Sate -although itself 
was not in war- was fighting against rebellions all around the empire!107 The question of 
unfavorable conditions applies to 1908 more than any year of single-party regime, and I 
am afraid, is enough for the collapse of “unique conditions” paradigm.      
 Back to the modernization paradigm... As I've said, this set of arguments were 
put forward by the Westerns for the non-Western world. So it is obvious that their way 
of looking at the matter is Eurocentric. Just as the modernizationists stipulate that every 
traditional society will follow Western societies in their development to become modern 
ones, the Kemalists stipulate that Turkey go through Atatürk revolutions to attain values 
of democracy, equality, freedom etc. The common mistake here is that while the 
modernization paradigm assumes that traditional societies are stable (and not dynamic), 
the Kemalist paradigm assumes a stable, monolithic Ottoman past. As Gusfield objects, 
developing societies are not stable; they are constantly subject to change, and it would 
be wrong to assume that every traditional society has forever existed in its current 
stage.108 Likewise, the Kemalists are basing their assumptions on the false premise that 
the Ottoman state was theocratic, and since it remained like that for 600 years, there was 
no way for it to produce democratic values (whether Islam or any kind of religion can 
go hand in hand with democracy is another debate and I will not go into that here).  
 This discussion brings us back to the transition from subject to citizen debate, 
described by the 8 figures I counted in the first chapter. When we accept Ottoman 
society as a theocratic state lacking pluralism, it might be argued that Turkish Republic 
did create subject from citizen. Transition from subject to citizen and from traditional to 
modern society go hand in hand, and is a good example of Kemalist paradigm combined 
with the modernization paradigm.     
 I talked about Emre Kongar's work Atatürk earlier and stated that I would come 
back to it. In two chapters of his book, Kongar discusses the objective and subjective 
conditions of a revolution. While discussing the objective conditions, Kongar is looking 
at the revolution structures all around the world and tries to come up with common 
                                                
107   Fevzi Demir, II. Meşrutiyet Seçimleri pp. 45-46. Demir points out that on 5th October, Bulgaria 
declares her independence and that the next day, Austria-Hungary Empire invades Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Again on 6th October, Crete Rums declare that the island is now part of Greece.  
108   Joseph R. Gusfield, cited in Levent Köker, Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi, p. 58.  
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elements, such as economic, social and political conditions. As to the subjective 
(peculiar) conditions of the Turkish revolution, Kongar discusses leadership (Atatürk), 
organizations (parliament, political parties etc.) and ideology (6 arrows).  
 What Kongar fails to see is that, majority of the elements he counts as objective 
conditions of revolution are actually the conditions of Turkey's single-party period. 
Kongar argues that if one or more of the following happens, a revolution might occur in 
a given society: a) If it is indefinite how the political power is to change; b) If the 
political power is not open to all groups and classes of society; c) If the rulers' ties with 
the classes, groups and people they represent are cut; d) If the political system doesn't 
give legitimate opposition to the dissidents; and e) If the people hold the belief that the 
current political order can not satisfy the needs of the society in the long run.109 As it is 
as plain as day, all these apply to the conditions of the single-party period of Turkey, 
rather than the last stages of the Ottoman Empire.   
 Emre Kongar goes on to apply all these conditions to the transition from the 
Ottoman Empire to Turkish Republic. While doing is, he bases all his analysis on the 
highly controversial premises that Ottoman Empire was economically and politically in 
chaos, that there was no way for pluralism -hence change of power- and that 
administrators had lost all their legitimacy for  representation.110 This will take us back 
to the discussion of whether there was pluralism and any hope for change of power in 
the last stage of the Ottoman Empire, and the answer will be positive. For instance, it is 
very interesting that Kongar claims that Ottoman parliament was effectively useless, 
and that Atatürk rendered it efficient,111 but historical sources suggest just the opposite! 
It can surely be argued that the parliament opened on 23rd April, 1920, was more 
efficient than any parliament of the Ottoman Empire, but I doubt whether this efficiency 
can be attributed to Mustafa Kemal. Also, knowing that Atatürk did away with the 
parliament once the National Struggle was over, suggesting that he rendered the 
parliament efficient would be highly problematic. 
 The whole content of my thesis -questioning the long embraced assertion that 
“conditions of the era” necessitated single-party regime- takes its roots from the false 
notion that economically, socially and politically, Ottoman State had collapsed and that 
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a new regime was required.112 It is obvious that Kongar -with his academic background- 
fully exploits this paradigm. For instance, identifying Ottoman society as an anomaly -a 
term coined by the sociologist Durkheim- Kongar argues that the last stage of the 
Ottoman State was nothing but chaos, citing the example that the most European and 
the most religious lifestyle could be observed in the same neighborhood; when in fact 
this should be interpreted as a token of a social and cultural diversity.  
 Another problem with Emre Kongar's analysis is that, the conditions he claims 
to be enough to trigger a revolution can not be applied to the Turkish case, because 
Turkish Revolution is a definite example of a top-down revolution. Political system's 
not being open to all groups, its being indefinite how the power is to change, or lack of 
toleration for opposition can only ignite bottom-up revolutions, not top-down; and 
Turkish case definitely corresponds to the latter one. It is not that Ottoman masses 
revolted because of the above-mentioned conditions and overthrew the sultan (as 
perhaps in the case of The French Revolution where angry masses stormed the Bastille 
on 14th July, 1789) but Atatürk -with the help of his charisma and the support of the 
army- overthrew the Ottoman government and declared himself as single-man (perhaps 
like Caesar did 2000 years ago by passing the river Rubicon).113 
 Emre Kongar also talks about the modernization theory and he not only himself 
applies the paradigm to Turkey, but also gives examples from social scientists who do 
that. While doing this, Kongar doesn't use the modernization paradigm fully, indicating 
its weaknesses and possible inefficiency in understanding the Turkish revolution (for it 
was put forward by Westerners). For instance, he resorts to Lerner who claims that 
every society goes through a modernization process that starts with urbanization which 
engenders an increase in literacy. Increase in literacy will then lead to propagation of 
communication devices, which will eventually increase political participation. Lerner 
                                                
112  It would not be wrong to say that, majority of Turkish historiography is dominated with 
accounts that present Ottoman Empire -in the words of Şükrü Hanioglu- with a 
“teleological...retrospective approach...” in which “it is...assumed that the emergence of Republic of 
Turkey in Anatolia and of the neighboring nation-states in the surrounding territories of the 
disintegrated Ottoman polity was the inevitable and predictable result of the decline of a sprawling 
multi-national empire.” (Hanioglu, p. 1)  
 For a meticulous study offering an opposite approach, please see Şükrü Hanioğlu, A Brief History of 
the Late Ottoman Empire.   
113   Some people might find it anachronistic to compare Atatürk and Caesar; after all they are 
almost 2000 years apart from each other. Yet I think their actions, the impetus behind those actions, 
and even results bear conspicuous similarity. It should also be kept in mind that when Mussolini 
marched on Rome, he did his best in order to be regarded as “a second...Caesar who had wished to 
enter the city on horseback surrounded by supporters.” Christopher Kelly, Roman Empire: A Very 
Short Introduction, p. 123. For how Kelly compares Caesar and Mussolini, and how he draws 
parallels between the Roman Empire and fascist Italy, see Ibid, pp. 122-126.   
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concludes by pointing out what happened in Turkey after 1940 as an evidence (proof) to 
his theory. Kongar uses a similar example by referring to Huntington, too, who argues 
that political modernization means propagation of political participation, rationalization 
of authority and the differentiation of structures. 
 Here, too, Emre Kongar fails to match the social theories with what actually 
happened in Turkey during the single-party period. While it does sound romantic that 
Atatürk revolution increased political participation, and sprawling of communication 
devices, the reality was much more different. It is obvious that political participation of 
the people was zero during the single-party regime, for there was only one party, and 
people could not attain communication devices at all, for all media was under strict 
censor. Kongar is probably referring to the fact that in 1950, with the DP's coming to 
power, political participation increased, but it would be quite fallacious to attribute this 
to the success of Atatürk revolution. As I will discuss soon, it is not that Atatürk regime 
aims transferring to democracy in the end -as unanimously proposed by the Kemalist 
literature- but rather it knows that it will be overthrown in the first free election.   
 Kongar also gives the example of script revolution as a factor to increase 
literacy; but if anything, script revolution pulled the level of literacy in society to %0 at 
once. Level of literacy skyrocketed perhaps due to campaigns all around the country, 
but it can easily be argued that it would happen anyway, without the script revolution. 
Also, it is obvious that the number of journals and newspapers published after 1908 -
when the censor was disposed off- is much more than that of any year of single-party 
regime, not to mention the diversity. 
 The last example Kongar uses -to relate modernization theories to Atatürk 
revolution- is from Frey, who is famous in Turkish historiography for his 
conceptualization of tutelage party for CHP, and I will discuss it now.               
Tutelage	  party,	  democracy	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	  teleologic	  historiography	   	  	  
 Was the single-party rule founded as a temporary solution, aiming multi-party 
democracy in the long run; or was the big picture a bit different than that? This is a 
question asked and answered many times, and in the mainstream Turkish 
historiography, there is a definite agreement that Kemalist Republic aimed a multi-party 
democracy (Kışlalı even argues that there were palpable examples that Atatürk wanted 
and applied participatory democracy). As I will give several examples below, the 
general agreement that Kemalism aimed for a multi-party democracy is based on the 
following premises: Atatürk was a democratic leader, who wanted Turkey to be a multi-
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party democracy. The fact that opposition parties were founded and that there was a 
certain degree of discussion room in his own party attest to this. It is true that opposition 
parties did not survive for long, but it was because of their -and the reactionary masses'- 
own mistakes. Attempts for multi-party regime failed during Atatürk's lifetime, because 
the conditions were not ripe yet. In this context, CHP was a tutelage party whose aim 
was to prepare the preconditions of multi-party democracy (such as enfranchising 
women). There had to be a single-party rule for 25 years, because the society was not 
ready for democracy. When the time came, CHP transferred to the multi-party system 
without any problems (smooth transition).  
 The amount of literature shows that there is a definite agreement about the 
above-mentioned premise. All the figures I've counted in the previous chapters -Ergun 
Özbudun, Maurice Duverger and Tarık Zafer Tunaya added- confirm and advocate the 
set of arguments that Atatürk embarked his project with the final aim of establishing a 
multi-party regime, but the conditions were not ripe, so a single-party regime was 
applied till the right time came. That Ergun Özbudun's -a scholar whom I can not 
categorize as Kemalist- supporting the theory that Atatürk wanted a democracy and 
worked for it should be notified.   
 Ergün Aybars, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Emre Kongar, Suna Kili, Ergun Özbudun, 
Nurşen Mazıcı, İlber Ortaylı and Anıl Çeçen all agree that the aim of Kemalist 
Revolution (and/or Atatürk) is democracy.114 Kongar and Özbudun stress this even 
more by pointing out that there is absolutely no doubt that the aim of Kemalizm is a 
democratic regime (Kongar adds an interesting point here by saying that “the principles 
of Republic aimed at full, impeccable democracy, no matter what was done in this 
direction”). Toktamış Ateş and Halil İnalcık do not talk about democracy directly, but 
instead touch upon the will of the people, the former stating that Atatürk respects the 
will of the people,115 whereas the latter talks about the principle of rendering national 
will sovereign.116  
 Assertions that Atatürk was a democratic leader and/or aimed it in the long run 
                                                
114   Emre Kongar, Demokrasi ve Laiklik, p. 119; Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek p. 47, 199, 223-24, 
260; Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Atatürk diktatör müydü?,” Cumhuriyet, 19 May 1993, as in Atatürk'e 
Saldırmanın Dayanılmaz Hafifliği. p. 47; Anıl Çeçen, 100 Soruda Kemalizm, p. 139; Suna Kili, Türk 
Devrim Tarihi, p. 253; İlber Ortaylı, Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yüzyılı, p. 116; Ergun Özbudun, “Atatürk ve 
Demokrasi,” as in Atatürkçü Düşünce El Kitabı, p. 117; Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik 
Demokrasi, p. 187; Nurşen Mazıcı, Tek Parti Dönemi, p. 10.  
115   Toktamış Ateş, cited in Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına, p. 30.  
116   Halil İnalcık, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” Doğu Batı, 29, as in Osmanlı ve Modern Türkiye. p. 
206. 
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are not confined to the above-mentioned ones. It is often the case that people desire to 
put forward palpable evidence for their claims. In this regard, Suna Kili presents people 
opposing to Atatürk during the national struggle as proof for his being democratic from 
the beginning.117 Aybars presents the concepts of freedom, parliamentary democracy 
and pluralism as information found in the Medeni Bilgiler book written by Atatürk 
himself.118 Aybars also claims that the goal is democracy and that the Republic prepared 
it.119 In addition, Ortaylı states that if there is still and ideal in Turkey for multi-party 
democracy, it is because Atatürk, in his youth, saw Europe like that.120           
 While talking about democracy, we should think what is meant by populism 
(halkçılık), a principle of Atatürk, and how it is interpreted in the mainstream literature, 
too. Özbudun and Kışlalı talk about populism, and put it forward as possible proof for 
Atatürk's being democratic.121 Kışlalı further argues that, Atatürk thought of 
modernization and democracy together,122 and that he was a populist.123 In addition, 
Turan claims that along with the republic, all democracy is in process, and that Atatürk 
neither operates populism, not republicanism, but only democracy.124    
 A very important concept that should be discussed here is the concept of tutelage 
party, and as I've tried to summarize above, the assertion puts forward that CHP was a 
tutelage party which prepared the prerequisites of democracy. The figures I will refer in 
this regard are the late Maurice Duverger -who coined the term dominant party- and 
Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Ergun Özbudun and Anıl Çeçen, who followed his 
conceptualization and contributed to the tutelage party literature accordingly.  
 Duverger who classifies single-party systems puts Turkey's CHP under the 
category of dominant party (the other ones include communist, fascist and totalitarian 
parties). A dominant party, Duverger argues, can be observed in underdeveloped 
societies, where the prerequisites of democracy are not yet ripe. The mission of the 
dominant party is to prepare the society for democracy, to modernize it. So CHP, 
                                                
117   Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 189.    
118   Ergün Aybars, as in Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına, p. 52. 
119   Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik Demokrasi, p. 187. 
120   İlber Ortayıl, Yakın Tarihin Gerçekleri, p. 101-102. 
121   Ergun Özbudun, “Atatürk ve Demokrasi,” as in Atatürkçü Düşünce El Kitabı, p. 116; Ahmet 
Taner Kışlalı, “Yollar da karıştı bölücüler de,” Cumhuriyet, 28 Aug. 1998, as in Ben Demokrat Değilim, 
p. 115. 
122   Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Akılsız dostlar mı yoksa akıllı düşmanlar mı?,” Cumhuriyet, 3 July 
1998, as in Ben Demokrat Değilim, p. 112-113.    
123   Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Yollar da karıştı bölücüler de,” Cumhuriyet, 28 Aug 1998, as in Ben 
Demokrat Değilim, p. 115.  
124   Şerafettin Turan, as in Mustafa Kemaller Görev Başına, p. 273. 
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according to Duverger, is a dominant party whose primary characteristic is its being 
democratic. The party does not think of itself as an eternal single-party, and will lose its 
ideological base when the society is ready for a multi-party regime. Because it is the 
harbinger of a multi-party system, it will bring its own end. CHP, according to 
Duverger, never actually liked this political monopoly of itself, and always regretted 
this.125  
 I should add here that Duverger did not always have this idea about CHP, 
Turkey's single-party, and changed his view as time went by. As Tunaya informs us, 
Duverger's first judgement in 1951 is that Kemalist regime is neither fascist, nor 
democratic. Also, this democracy failed to be social. In 1955, he argues that Kemalist 
regime should be examined under the category of so-called fascist regimes, though it is 
slightly different from paternalist dictatorships; and the Turkish single-party regime is a 
republican dictatorship. In 1961, Duverger softens his judgement and reaches the 
conclusion I've presented earlier, which is the ever since accepted and related judgement 
of his: Turkey should be evaluated within the category of underdeveloped nations, and 
that CHP was a tutelage party that in reality aimed true democracy. The party's inner 
structure always remained democratic, generating its own dissidents. Also, unlike the 
fascist and totalitarian single-parties, CHP promoted democracy.126 Tunaya, who will 
later coin the term vesayet partisi (tutelage party), recommends this taxonomy best, 
along with Anıl Çeçen and Ergun Özbudun. 
 The first and foremost thing that should be uttered about this tutelage party and 
democracy in the long run claim is that -though it is highly celebrated- it completely 
lacks factual basis. It is true that in social sciences, there should be certain theories, and 
that merely telling what happened might not be the best idea. However, what we are 
seeing here (as Cemil Koçak127 and Mete Tunçay128 state) is producing theories without 
basing them on facts. We can come up with millions of theories that will categorize 
Turkey's CHP as a party who wishes to prepare the bridge to democracy, but 
unfortunately, the reality does not correspond to that. For one thing, the party's program 
in 1931 clearly states CHP as the “single-party of Turkey”, meaning that its founders do 
not think of it as a temporary solution.129 Moreover, perhaps the only two things that 
                                                
125   Maurice Duverger, Siyasi Partiler, p. 359-64. 
126   Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Siyasi Müesseseler ve Anayasa Hukuku, p. 552-53. 
127   Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 652. 
128   Mete Tunçay, TC'nde Tek-Parti, p. 1   
129   Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 176. 
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can be pointed out as proofs of constructing the bridge to democracy are woman 
enfranchisement, and the independent candidates elected in 1931/34 elections, but there 
are problems with accepting these developments as stages for democracy.  
 It is always claimed in Turkish historiography that Atatürk granted women the 
right to vote, which shows that he values democracy. Yet I have a different point of 
view. Perhaps it should first be questioned -as Sevan Nişanyan does-130 what kind of a 
significance women enfranchisement might have, in a regime where there is only one 
party, and no free elections. This is something almost never questioned, and there is an 
unwavering belief in Turkish historiography that Atatürk's giving women the right to 
vote is a step towards democracy. It can also be argued that in granting this privilege to 
women, Atatürk -and CHP cadre- actually acted slowly and aloof, and that women 
obtained their rights in the wake of a long struggle, before France (1944), Japan (1945) 
and Switzerland (1971), but after 33 countries (15 of them being non-European 
countries).131  It can be questioned for instance, that while women founded around 100 
organizations and published many newspapers between 1870 and 1923,132 early 
Republican elites ignored the position of women for a long time. Perhaps the best we 
can say about women's acquiring of enfranchisement, as Zürcher states, is to address it 
“as an important step in the emancipation of Turkish women.”133 It should not be 
ignored here that, that emancipation started during the Ottoman Empire and the level it 
reached during the single-party period was not very bright.  
 It is also assumed that, CHP's leaving some space for independent candidates in 
1931 elections is a sign of democracy, but there are two problems here. The first is that, 
the party itself decides on who will be independent candidates. Ahmet Demirel relates 
that for the 1931 elections, although around 15-20 people applied everyday for 
candidacy, it was written in CHP records that none of the 1400 people who had applied 
until then would be considered for candidacy.134 Cemil Koçak also argues, perhaps with 
a similar concern, that it is dubious how much “independent” the independent 
                                                
130   Sevan Nişanyan, Yanlış Cumhuriyet, p. 70.   
131   Ayşe Hür, Öteki Tarih III, p. 214-215. The countries where women get their right of vote 
before Turkey are as follows: New Zealand, Australia, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Russia, 
the Netherlands, England, Germany, Austria, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Albania, Czech Republic, the 
USA, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Sweden, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Ecuador, 
Romania, Republic of South Africa, Spain, Chile, Portugal, Uruguay, Thailand and Brazil.     
132   Ibid, p. 208; Fatmagül Berktay, “Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Feminizm,” as in Tanzimat ve 
Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, p. 35; Nicole A. N. M. Van Os, “Osmanlı Müslümanlarında Feminizm,” as in 
Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi, pp. 336-37 and 344-345.   
133   Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 177. 
134   Ahmet Demirel, Tek-Partinin İktidarı, p. 115. 
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candidates elected for the 1935 elections were.135 The second, and perhaps a more 
crucial thing, is that the term democracy invokes in mind rule of the people, which 
means that when there is only one party, it does not matter much when 30 or so 
independent congressmen enter the parliament. It is argued by Duverger, Kışlalı and 
Tunaya that there is room in CHP for pluralism, but the facts do not lead us tho their 
conclusion. This is another example of what I mean by producing theories without 
basing them on facts.  
 I will deal with the opposition parties in the next chapter, but I should utter a few 
words now, for their existence is related to the tutelage party arguments. There is a 
definite agreement that Turkish single-party CHP aimed at pluralism, and that 
opposition parties are a sign of this. I do not quite grasp how this argument is made, for 
if CHP had aimed at pluralism in the long run -as argued by the above-mentioned 
figures- the opposition parties should not (and would not) have been closed down. It is 
known that TPCF, the first opposition party, lasted for 4 months and SCF for only 3 
months. It is also known that both parties were banned from competing in free elections 
(SCF actually did compete in the 1930 municipality elections but since substantial 
corruption was observed, those elections can not be titled as “free”). If the argument is 
that CHP is trying to prepare the society for democracy -the most basic and primary 
condition of democracy being voting- shouldn't it have led the “ignorant” masses to 
vote, at least for one election? Rather than preparing the prerequisites of full-fledge 
democracy, what CHP did seems to be closer to “systematically obliterating all 
ideologic and institutional conditions of democracy.”136  
 I said above that I would come back to the Sonderweg example, and I think it is 
worth considering Sonderweg and tutelage party examples within the framework of 
teleologic history. It is argued in the German mainstream historiography that every 
society will modernize and follow the path of Western states -preferably England and 
France- by going through successful bourgeois revolutions, which as a corollary, will 
produce liberal democratic values. Similarly, it is argued in the mainstream Turkish 
historiography that, CHP was a tutelage party whose aim in the long run was to 
establish full-fledge democracy. These are almost quintessential examples of teleologic 
history, meaning that a desired goal is identified to be reached in the long run, and that 
every step taken will be construed accordingly, within that flow. Just as Germany's 
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unsuccessful bourgeois revolution in the second half of the 19th century is shown as a 
reason for lack of democracy,  Turkey's single-party regime is used to justify that lack 
of democracy.  
 Within this context, there is again a definite consensus that Democratic Party 
(DP) founded in 1946 is the final step of single-party regime, attesting full-fledge 
democracy.  However, as Cemil Koçak points out, there is hardly ever evidence in 1945 
that the second party is to be founded (meaning, there is doubt whether this smooth 
transition has been planned for long). Nor the process of allowing for the second party 
seems irreversible.137 Likewise, as Geoff Eley and David Blackbourn argue, it is not the 
best idea to “present German history since the middle of the last century as if the known 
outcome in 1933 was inscribed in every event...which leads to a teleologic 
blandness.”138 Besides, as I've argued above, this teleologic German Sonderweg 
argument collapses when both a positive and a negative version exist, fallaciously 
determining the result based on Germany's success on the fronts. As Köker rightly 
observes, concepts such as tutelage party are coined ex post facto, after everything is 
over and done with.139    
 I've stated above that Duverger changed his views about the single-party 
position of CHP in time. It might be helpful to combine this with the modernization 
theory, to get the big picture. As I've described above, the modernization theory 
identifies two kinds of societies (traditional and modern), and that non-Western 
societies will follow Western ones in this process. This theory also envisages a 
transition period, the characteristics of which might be coercion and oppression.   
 It can be assumed that Duverger places Turkish single-party CHP within the 
modernization theory, identifying Ottoman society as a traditional and the Turkey 
Atatürk wanted to create a modern one, and the single-party period as the authoritarian 
transition stage. It is obvious that if the modernization theory is taken at its face value, it 
perfectly fits the Kemalist paradigm that CHP was an ephemeral single-party during a 
period of modernization.  It is also not surprising that Duverger reached this conclusion 
in 1961, when the modernization theory -in terms of acceptance in academia- saw its 
peak. As Aykut Kansu rightly argues, the most efficient way for the revival of Kemalist 
ideology in the academic circle, was the Modernization Paradigm and its interpretation 
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peculiar to Turkey.140   
 It should be questioned that the first two conceptualizations of Duverger as to 
Turkish single-party did not include anything like this, and they were perhaps closer to 
reality (I am not trying to identify Atatürk's CHP as fascist or totalitarian here; I am 
rather suggesting that it is closer to them than a democratic one). Here, I find it 
impossible to agree with Tunaya, who adopts Duverger's last conceptualization of CHP 
in 1961 as a tutelage party aiming democracy. It is not surprising that other than 
Tunaya, almost no historian is aware that Duverger changed his judgement about 
Turkey's single-party regime. The figures who want to see CHP as a transient party 
embrace Duverger's theory fully, without ever mentioning how his views on Turkish 
single-party period changed in time.         
 One thing Duverger argues is that unlike fascist and totalitarian regimes which 
advocate authoritarianism, there is advocation of democracy in the Kemalist single-
party. Although historians desiring to justify single-party regime (including advocating 
that Atatürk was democratic) clinch to this assertion frequently, it seems to lack factual 
basis. Until the year 1930 when the Free Republican Party was established and 
dissolved, a basic research about the single-party of Turkey will show us that after 
1923, Atatürk doesn't make considerable reference to democracy.141 When Duverger 
claims that there was daily advocation of democracy in Kemalist Turkey, he is either 
not taking this from any sources, or a second alternative is that -as Cemil Koçak 
suggests- he might have heard it from Turkish people who were in Europe at that 
time.142 I will discuss SCF in the next chapter, within the opposition parties but for the 
time being, let me say this much: If Duverger's source for this premise is what he heard 
from the Turkish people, than the official ideology's using Duverger for the same claim 
presents us a circular argument. Turkish historians' claim that CHP advocated 
democracy based on Duverger's writing which are based on Turkish people is not very 
different than -mind the example- trying to prove the existence of God by pointing out 
the holy book, which is the word of God.        
 At this stage, I find it useful to go back to the assertion that Atatürk wanted 
democracy in the long run, and approach it from a different point of view. Two things 
are obvious: 1) Neither Atatürk as person, nor CHP as party aimed democracy. 2) It is 
                                                
140   Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, p. 9. 
141   Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 642. 
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dogma in mainstream Turkish historiography that Atatürk wanted democracy either in 
the long, or in the short run. I find it very important to ponder about this matter.  
 Democracy is a concept mostly perceived positively. Except in 
fascist/totalitarian societies where democracy is often degraded, it is a concept to which 
mostly positive meaning is attributed. It is often the case in history that people accuse 
their rulers for being undemocratic. It is often the case that societies' transferring to 
democracy is related as a positive thing. This also goes for Turkish historiography, too, 
where the so-called smooth transition in 1950 is not only celebrated, but identified as a 
success of Atatürk. The bottom line is that democracy is mostly identified with positive 
values, and even if it is not applied in the current time, it is a desired goal in the long 
run.  
 When the situation is like this, it is not at all surprising to identify either Atatürk 
or the single-party CHP as democratic, even though they are the antithesis of it. Atatürk 
is a leader that is idolized, even sometimes deified. He is not democratic, nor there can 
hardly be pointed out any practice during the single-party regime to serve for 
democracy in the long run. If anything, dissolution of TPCF in 1925; execution and 
suppression of unorganized opposition in 1926, after the foiled İzmir assassination; the 
change in CHP's program in 1927 that authorizes Atatürk as the sole decision maker in 
member election; suppression of the Turkish Hearth movement in 1931; the purge in the 
former Istanbul University in 1933; and the dissolution of Turkish Women's Union in 
1935 all attest, without any doubt, that the regime does not have much toleration for 
different voices.143 Still, since democracy invokes positive values and there is a political 
leader who is almost worshipped, there is the need to match the two. That is why, Emre 
Kongar has a subheading in his book Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek, titled as “Ataturkism 
is surely democratic.”144 Kongar himself probably knows that assertions to identify 
Ataturkism as democratic will lack factual basis. Yet, he still does his best to match the 
two.  
 Here, it might be interesting and useful to briefly touch upon Kongar's 
conceptualization of “democratic nationalism.” In at least two of his works, Kongar 
uses this term -although in one of them with the words “progressive nationalism”- and 
in both, he is talking about Atatürk nationalism. He is also making reference to 
Atatürk's famous motto “How happy is one who says I am a Turk.” The distinction he 
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makes is that the nationalism of inter-war Europe -he directly addresses Nazi Germany- 
is aggressive and destructive; but that the nationalism of Atatürk is compromising and 
integrative.145 I see it appropriate to identify this as euphemistic. One who scours all the 
nationalist literature -be it Hobsbawm, Anderson, Özkırımlı, Gellner etc.- can not find a 
coining of “democratic nationalism” (there is “national democratic revolution,” but not 
“democratic nationalism”). It seems impossible to identify a nationalism as 
“democratic;” it is against the very nature of democracy to go hand in hand with 
nationalism, which is by definition an exclusionist ideology. But again, it is important to 
understand why Kongar is using this conceptualization. It is probably because 
nationalism is an Atatürk principle, and that Turkish single-party regime adopted 
nationalism both as ideology and in practice. It is therefore necessary to affix some kind 
of a positive meaning to that concept of nationalism. When Atatürk nationalism is 
identified as “democratic,” or “progressive” perhaps the discriminatory aspect of 
nationalism and its destructive practices -for instance Dersim massacre- are attempted to 
be minimized. It is similar with identifying Atatürk regime (or directly himself) as 
democratic. In both, there is an unflattering situation, and since the person who is 
responsible for it is worshipped, there is a need for euphemism.                  
 All the scholars I've named above should pretty much be aware that Kemalist 
regime can not be identified democratic. But at the same time, they do know that 
Kemalist regime will always be criticized for being anti-democratic. So what they are 
doing, is to take a preemptive measure. By identifying Atatürk and his regime as 
democracy, or asserting that even if it was not democratic, that it desired to reach 
democracy in the long run, they are taking precautions against possible harsh criticism 
that would definitely be brought against the single-party regime. It should be noted that, 
we hardly ever see any denouncing of democracy in the Kemalist literature, perhaps 
because it will directly encounter with an accusation of fascism. Instead, what we see is 
that democracy is duly praised, and it is identified as  an aim to reach int he end. 
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“Opposition in our country...definitely corrupts to treachery and infidelity...Sometimes 
treachery and infidelity themselves, are the raison d'etre of opposition” Yunus Nadi 
 
	  
IV.	  Opposition	  against	  Atatürk	  and	  its	  portrayal	  
 
 Democracy is a term whose roots go back to the Ancient Greece and it basically 
means rule of the people. How this is realized in practice is through voting (ballot box). 
It is obvious from this definition that there can be absolutely no democracy without 
opposition. There is also a fair agreement within the exponents of the single-party rule 
which corresponds to this proposal.  Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, Emre Kongar and Nurşen 
Mazıcı all accept that there can not be a democracy without opposition.146 However, 
there is also a more or less agreement that opposition against Atatürk before and during 
the single-party regime had a backward, reactionary, religious, Ottomanist, counter 
revolutionary etc. character, and that the opposition had to be quashed. This chapter will 
deal with the characteristics of opposition against Ataturk and the way it is portrayed 
within the Turkish historiography.  
 Figures who justify the single-party regime do this based on at least one of the 
following premises: 1) The members of both Progressive Republican Party (TPCF) and 
Free Republican Party (SCF) were reactionaries, Ottomanist, and they were against the 
revolutions which were necessary for the development and modernization of Turkey; 2) 
The socio-economic conditions of the country when the opposition parties were 
established were so bad, that in such an atmosphere, democracy could not (and would 
not) survive (an argument thoroughly examined in the previous chapter); 3) Atatürk did 
                                                
146    Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Tek Parti ve Demokrasi,” Cumhuriyet, 24 Apr 1998, cited in Ben 
Demokrat Değilim, p. 103; Emre Kongar, Demokrasimizle Yüzleşmek, p. 19 and 46; Nurşen Mazıcı, 
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not want to dissolve the opposition parties, but they had to be closed down. 4) When 
both attempts for transferring to multi-party regime failed, it was understood that the 
society had not yet internalized the revolutions; so time was not right. 
 There is abundant material in the Kemalist historiography to correspond to the 
above mentioned story. While Aybars147 and Kili148 insinuate that TPCF was 
characterized by reactionism, İlber Ortaylı149 and Kışlalı150 assert the same thing both 
for TPCF and SCF. Kışlalı also implies that these opposition parties would not have 
been dissolved had they not been reactionaries, stating that the reason why they were 
dissolved was not because they wanted more democracy, but because they turned into a 
counter revolutionary focal.     
 Thanks to Cemil Koçak's meticulous study, Belgelerle İktidar ve Serbest 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası, there is more than necessary amount of knowledge as to what has 
been written so far about SCF. The official point of view, which made itself into school 
textbook as early as 1931 -only one year after the party was established and dissolved- 
states that SCF was closed down -in fact dissolved itself- because of reactionaries that 
dominated the party.151 This official ideology was voiced myriad times starting from 
1931, eventually becoming the heart of the mainstream view about SCF.152 Koçak states 
that Duverger also adopts the view that SCF was closed down because of the 
reactionaries that permeated the party.153 
 It can be understood from these that there is a relatively general agreement that 
both opposition parties TPCF and SCF were closed because of their own faults. Before 
discussing this further, I would like to focus on a different point of view about TPCF, 
voiced by even figures who justify the single-party rule. Nevin Yurdsever Ateş who 
wrote her Ph.D. on TPCF states that, the party was “unlike some people assert, neither a 
religious party, nor reactionary or conservative.”154 This view of Ateş is based on the 
program of the party itself155, and is corroborated by Mete Tunçay156 and Feroz 
                                                
147   Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik Demokrasi, p. 57.  
148   Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 210.  
149   İlber Ortaylı, Yakın Tarihin Gerçekleri, p. 98. 
150   Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Tek Parti ve Demokrasi,” Cumhuriyet, 24 Apr 1998, as in Ben Demokrat 
Değilim, p. 104. 
151   Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 52 and 646.  
152   Ibid, 21-167. Here, Koçak presents a chronologic summary of how SCF is evaluated, by both 
orthodox historians and dissident voices.  
153   Ibid, p. 646. 
154   Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 323. 
155   Ibid, p. 190-191.   
156   Mete Tunçay, TC'de Tek-Parti, p. 108.  
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Ahmad157 both of whose overall proclivities can be construed as advocation of the 
single-party regime. What I mean here is that, TPCF is not identified with derogatory 
adjectives even by some figures who justify the single-party rule based on the 
“conditions.” Finally, Erik Jan Zürcher, too, states that, it was evident that TPCF 
 
  ...was a party in the Western European liberal mould. It stood for  
  secular and nationalist policies...it clearly opposed...radical, centralist 
  and authoritarian tendencies. Instead it advocated decentralization,  
  separation of powers and evolutionary rather than revolutionary change.  
  It also had a more liberal economic policy.158 
 
 I will come back to why in the mainstream historiography of Turkey the TPCF is 
condemned as backward, reactionary etc. (when there is enough reason to think 
differently) but for the time being, let me go on stating that when the party was 
established, it was welcomed with great enthusiasm, especially by the Istanbul press. 
While Zürcher states that “the mood in many parts of the country...certainly...in 
Istanbul...favoured an opposition party”159 Tunçay states that most of the Istanbul press 
supported the opposition against the government160, and that it found wide acclaim in 
the press.161   
 Before moving to the discussion phase, I will touch upon the opposition in the 
first parliament, founded on 23rd April, 1920, because we need to do this in order to 
assess the opposition against Atatürk. The most rigorous study as to the opposition in 
the first parliament has so far been conducted by Ahmet Demirel. In his work, Birinci 
Meclis'te Muhalefet, while summarizing the course of work about the first parliament, 
Demirel states with disapproval that until that time (1993) most of the studies about the 
first parliament were dominated by cliches which identified the 2nd group as backwards, 
reactionary, Ottomanist, sultanist etc.162 A meticulous study by Demirel, however, 
reveals that the group was predominantly against personal tyranny, tried to render the 
power of law efficient163 and that in certain occasions, did its best in taking action with 
                                                
157   Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu, p. 72. 
158   Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 168. 
159   Ibid, p. 169. 
160   Mete Tunçay, TC'de Tek-Parti, p. 109. 
161   Ibid, p. 112. 
162   Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet. For this mainstream cliche definitions of 2nd 
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163   Ibid, p. 45. 
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the first group founded by Atatürk.164   
 It is true that not all the figures who legitimize single-party rule based on the 
apologist canard “conditions of the era” adopt this above-mentioned definitions about 
opposition parties. For instance, while Halil İnalcık identifies the structure of the first 
parliament as democratic, adding that it declared its legitimacy with the motto 
“Hakimiyet-i Milliye” (sovereignty of the people), he does not use the cliche 
“backward,” “Ottomanist,” “reactionary” identification for the opposition (2nd group).165 
Likewise, Suna Kili rightly identifies the characteristic of the 2nd group in the 1st 
parliament, by stating that it bears people from all walks of life.166  However, as I am 
trying to point out, there is still a general proclivity to condemn the opposition against 
Mustafa Kemal, and this mostly goes for the opposition parties TPCF and SCF. Ahmet 
Demirel's -and to a certain extent Nevin Yurdsever Ateş's- studies should be important 
examples to reveal the inclination to denigrate the opposition against Atatürk without 
even looking at the primary sources. In fact, one reason Demirel states for defining the 
second group as reactionary is because of the “problem of method in academic circles, 
which is accepting repeated cliches without feeling the need to confirm them from first 
hand sources.”167  
 The definition of dissidents against Atatürk in the Turkish mainstream 
historiography should be questioned thoroughly, and when it is done, an important 
aspect of the legitimization of the single-party rule will be refuted. The bottom line is 
that, people who opposed to Atatürk either before or during the single-party regime is 
automatically stigmatized as reactionary, sultanist, counter-revolutionary etc. But it 
should be kept in mind that, rather than analyzing the opposition and reaching a 
conclusion which has definitely negative connotations, what is done is to try to come up 
with apologies to justify single-party regime, and this is actually what I have been 
discussing throughout this work. It should be kept in mind that SCF, the “reactionary” 
opposition party founded in 1930 was derivative of CHP; and TPCF, another 
“reactionary” opposition party founded in 1925 consisted of Mustafa Kemal's friends 
and commanders of the National Struggle!   
 Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, who -unlike the mainstream Kemalist figures- rightly 
                                                
164   Ibid, p. 612.  
165   Halil İnalcık, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” Doğu-Batı, 29, as in Osmanlı ve Modern Türkiye, p. 
169. 
166   Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 82. 
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identifies the ideology of TPCF as liberal, is still inclined to justify and legitimize 
single-party rule by relating how bad the conditions are. The following evaluation of 
Ateş are definitely worth examining: 
 
  When we look at the political atmosphere and the socio-economic  
  conditions on which it was founded, we see that the year 1924  
  was really a hard year... Proclamation of the Republic, dissolution  
  of the Caliphate, reactions caused by revolutions not adopted by  
  the public...the bad situation of the country's economy...increased  
  the discontent day by day... The year 1924 was really a regime year.168    
 
After making this explanation, towards the end of her work, Ateş asks “What would 
happen if in 1924, democratic elections were allowed? Could the society (meaning 
Ottoman society, UD), whose literacy level was less than 15% and who have for years 
been subjugated, rationally determine their own future?”169 Ateş does not directly 
answer to this question as “No,” and instead says that we can not know. But as I will 
fully discuss in the final chapter, there can be hardly any reason not to answer this 
question as “Yes.” If the people of the II. Constitution (1908) and the National Struggle 
(1920) could do this, why wouldn't the people of 1924 do?   
 An issue worth discussing is whether the opposition parties TPCF and SCF can 
be addressed as “attempts for multi-party.” There is a definite agreement in the 
Kemalist historiography about this matter. Suna Kili,170 Ergün Aybars,171 and İlber 
Ortaylı172 all prefer to address the foundation and dissolution processes of both TPCF 
and SCF as “attempts for trying to transfer to multi-party.” Ortaylı even argues that 
Atatürk wanted democracy, and gives these “attempt”s as example. Yet, there seems to 
be a serious problem as to how these can be addressed as “multi-party attempt”s, let 
alone Atatürk's endeavor for multi-party regime. The main problem is that, these parties 
are presented in the Kemalist historiography as if they were desired to be allowed to 
take place in the parliament and compete in elections, but the big picture is quite 
different. Immediately, I can hear opposition raised, especially about SCF, but I intend 
to approach the matter from a different point. 
 The first problem with identifying TPCF as attempt for multi-party is that, the 
                                                
168   Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 318. 
169   Ibid, p. 323. 
170   Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 229 and 232. 
171   Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik Demokrasi, p. 58, 62 and 190.  
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dissolution of TPCF itself effectively meant the end of multi-party regime. In this 
respect, a party that only survived for 5 months can hardly be addressed as “attempt for 
democracy.” Also, the formation of this party was not elicited by CHP elites, but the 
discontent members themselves decided to part company with CHP and founded their 
own party. 
 Another problem is that, since the story for justifying the single-party regime 
puts forward the assertion that Atatürk wanted democracy in the long run but that it 
could not happen till the society absorbed the revolution173, a party that is founded in 
1924 -only 1 year after the proclamation of Turkish Republic- can not be titled as 
“attempt for democracy,” for the revolution “has got promises to keep, and so many 
miles to go before it sleeps.” Let me elucidate this point. The argument as to the 
“attempt”s for multi-party regime goes as follows: Turkish Republic has to be a single-
party regime because of the extra-ordinary conditions. When the time is right, there 
surely will be new parties. But until the revolution is realized, there can be no way for 
opposition.174 If this story is correct, and accordingly there will be opposition parties 
when the time comes, that time can not be in 1924, when the revolution is in its very, 
very early stage. This is another example to show what is done within the Kemalist 
historiography: Instead of reaching conclusions based on facts, coming up with 
theoretical explanations to justify the end result, which can hardly ever go beyond 
apology.  
 While the above-mentioned explanation discredits the story behind identifying 
TPCF as attempt for democracy, some might assume that it should directly correspond 
to the SCF story. After all SCF was founded in 1930, after a substantial part of the 
revolution was achieved, and that Atatürk had the party founded in the wake of that 
famous story where he utters the words: “Today our landscape is more or less that of a 
dictatorship...I do not want to leave behind a despotic institution.”175 If SCF had been a 
real opposition party that consisted of members that were not content in CHP, and had 
SCF not been dissolved within 3 months, this story would make sense. When a leader 
states his democratic intention, it is expected from him to allow for free elections. Only 
allowing for the establishment of a second party can hardly attest to a democratic 
intention, and what was done in the SCF story was, as Cemil Koçak argues, only to 
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allow a second party to be formed, and not for allowing any other democratic rights, 
such as a third party or freedom of press.176     
 Unfortunately, it does not seem very plausible to take SCF as an opposition 
party, mainly because of two reasons. The first is that SCF was not properly allowed to 
compete in the upcoming local elections, and the second is that people were almost 
forced to become members of SCF, to the point of regretting and wanting to go back to 
their party CHP. 177 With the information we have and more or less knowing what 
happened in reality, SCF can perhaps best be identified -as Süreyya İlmen and Ahmet 
Ağaoğlu relates- as an agent for intimidating İsmet Paşa178 -who had been the Prime 
Minister for 5 years- or as a mere ground for discussing, and criticizing politics lightly. 
An opposition party can be counted as an opposition party as long as it is free from the 
tyrannical practices of the power and has equal chance with the party in power. Since it 
is known that in the local elections right after SCF was established, huge corruption was 
observed,179 it is obvious that the party will not be allowed to compete for power, 
meaning it is not planned as a political party. In this respect, Cemil Koçak's assertion 
that SCF was not actually planned as a political party seems to make more sense than 
the official story which portrays SCF as “an attempt for democracy.” SCF would 
perhaps be the opposition among the republican elites of CHP. To quote from Cemil 
Koçak, while establishing SCF, “Atatürk put forward his predilection for a political 
opposition in the level of elites, rather than a social opposition.”180  
 While identifying SCF as backward, reactionary, anti-revolutionist etc., it might 
be useful to keep in mind that, not only all the members of SCF did come out of CHP 
itself, but that they were handpicked by Atatürk. SCF is a party whose members were 
chosen by Atatürk himself, including his sister Makbule. What I am trying to say is that, 
if SCF is stormed by reactionaries or Sharia enthusiasts (as asserted by Ortaylı, İnalcık, 
Kili and Kışlalı),181 this also means that CHP bears in itself the same group of people. 
                                                
176   Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 689 
177   Sevan Nişanyan, Yanlış Cumhuriyet. p. 32 
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181   İlber Ortaylı, Cumhuriyet'in İlk Yüzyılı, 161; Halil İnalcık, “Atatürk ve Atatürkçülük,” Doğu-
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Perhaps the bottom line we can say here is that, all organized or individual opposition 
against Mustafa Kemal is stigmatized as reactionary, religionist etc., not because they fit 
this description, but because there is not much toleration for opposition; neither by 
Mustafa Kemal himself nor his followers who try their best to justify single-party 
authoritarianism. 
 A note should be made as to whether SCF abolished itself, or was abolished. The 
mainstream account assumes that SCF dissolved itself, and in fact uses this to justify the 
single-party rule. While Suna Kili, Ergün Aybars and Toktamış Ateş directly state that 
SCF dissolved itself,182 Ortaylı claims that certain groups within CHP made SCF 
dissolve183, and Hakkı Uyar prefers to state that on performing an unexpected political 
success, SCF had to retreat from political life in short time.184 Cemil Koçak also quotes 
the dialogue between a vexed İnönü and Atatürk where he asks why Atatürk is closing 
the party and Atatürk replies that he is not doing anything; they (SCF members) are 
dissolving it themselves.185 
 It is understood from these that there is a general tendency in the Kemalist 
literature to hold SCF accountable for its dissolution, and Atatürk verbally endorses 
this. The problem here is that, while it is absolutely right that on paper, SCF closed 
itself (with the action of Fethi Okyar, the founder of the party, writing a petition to 
declare the dissolution of the party), we must take into consideration the process that 
lead to its dissolution. As I will discuss in the next chapter, the party performed an 
unexpected success and soon became a political alternative instead of CHP.186 But it is 
only after things started to get out of control and that Mustafa Kemal declared openly 
that he is the leader and the founder of CHP, that Fethi Bey understood he had to defeat 
Mustafa Kemal to make the party survive.187 So it is not that SCF dissolved itself 
voluntarily, but that on understanding that his party would not be allowed to compete in 
the political arena with CHP, Fethi Bey saw no other choice but to close it. Fethi Bey's 
decision should be interpreted as an action to save himself from being targeted as 
traitor, rather than reactionaries storming the party.            
 It might be useful to look into how the opposition against Atatürk is evaluated 
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by Atatürk himself. In this regard, what should be said is that while the definition for 
TPCF in the Kemalist historiography directly corresponds to Atatürk's own evaluation 
about TPCF, we can not say the same the same thing for the opposition in the first 
parliament. To put it more pointedly; whereas contemporary evaluation of the first 
parliament more or less confirms Atatürk's evaluation about the   second group, 
assessments prior to Ahmet Demirel's, do not. While Atatürk states for the second group 
that there was not much difference in terms of ideology, and that the problem was 
mostly personal,188 the studies like that of Enver Behnan Şapolyo's -the coiner of what 
became cliche criticism about the first group- present the commonly held assessment 
which defined the first group as “reactionaries/Ottomanists” etc.189 Yet, the commonly 
held definition about the first opposition party TPCF directly takes its source from 
Nutuk (The Speech), where the pejorative adjectives Atatürk uses for the dissidents 
include “villains,” “pitiful” “slothful,” “craven” etc.190  
 A point that deserves attention is the persistent attitude by single-party advocates 
to describe any kind of opposition against Atatürk with derogatory adjectives such as 
“backwards,” “reactionary,” “anti-revolutionist” etc. There is a general tendency to 
disparage both SCF and TPCF, and in some cases, the second group in the first 
parliament, too, receives its share from this condemnation. This attitude is corroborated 
by the foreign press, and its earlier indications  can be observed in 1926, right after the 
purge of the remaining opposition based on the alleged İzmir conspiracy. An Italian 
newspaper in 1924 presents the news of the emergence of TPCF, stating that “just as it 
is natural for Europeans to have an opposition party, a party in Turkey consisting of 
around 20 people is the evocation of treachery.”191  Judging a later article of Yunus 
Nadi -a staunch Kemalist figure establishing Cumhuriyet newspaper on the behest of 
Atatürk to champion the Kemalist tenets- this pessimistic observation of the Italian 
newspaper can be viewed as a prophecy. Nadi avers in 1926, in his article titled as 
“Opposition in Turkey” that, opposition in Turkey means betrayal (treachery).192 The 
groups Nadi talks about in this article are the second group in the first parliament, the 
TPCF and the pro-İttihat figures, meaning all the opposition that stood against Atatürk 
until that time (SCF would be established later). Nadi not only clearly states that 
                                                
188   Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet, p. 17. 
189   Ibid, pp. 15-16.  
190   Sevan Nişanyan, Yanlış Cumhuriyet pp. 65-66. 
191   Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 319. 
192   Cited in Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Mecliste Muhalefet, p. 605. 
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opposition in Turkey is always meant treachery, but he claims that sometimes, treachery 
is the raison d'etre of that opposition. Knowing that Atatürk himself uses derogatory 
epithets in his Nutuk for TPCF members, it might be instructive to note that this 
proclivity to condemn the dissidents has been ubiquitous in Turkey -even today- as also 
noted by Sevan Nişanyan.193 
 Holding that TPCF is a counter-revolutionary party is another prevalent opinion 
among the proponents of single-party regime, and it deserves attention, too. Kışlalı, 
Kili, Aybars and Çeçen all identify either SCF or both TPCF and SCF as counter/anti 
revolutionist,194 and based upon this assumption, they justify the closure of these 
parties. While it might at first seem plausible to identify these dissidents as anti-
revolutionist -after all they openly oppose Mustafa Kemal- a closer look will discredit 
this story as well. A little reflection shows that the opponents of Mustafa Kemal were 
not against the revolutions; on the contrary, they were against the idea of revolutions 
becoming the tool of one man. We can reach this conclusion both from their party 
program, and from their actions. Zürcher states that the party's program emphasizes that 
the party is against radical reforms unless they are authorized by the people.195 He also 
emphasizes that despite what people think, there is no indication that TPCF desired to 
undo what had been done till then.196 Articles 49, 50, and 51 of the party's program for 
instance, make it clear that the party advocates national education,197 hence their 
support of Tevhid-i Tedrisat (Law on Unification of Education) 8 months ago. It is also 
well known that, before the establishment of TPCF, sultanate was abolished in 1922 
unanimously198 -meaning later members of TPCF voted for the abolishment- and that 
right after the establishment of TPCF, when the government proposed by İsmet Paşa in 
1924 got vote of confidence, fresh TPCF members voted in favour.199 While giving vote 
of confidence to the new government, Ali Fuat Paşa's requesting that CHP elites not 
                                                
193   Sevan Nişanyan, Yanlış Cumhuriyet, p. 67.  
 At the time I am typing this thesis, this attitude is still dominant in Turkey. Most of the opposition 
against President Erdoğan and his former party AKP is condemned with accusations of treachery, or 
with being representatives of what the pro-government calls as “parallel state.” In the near future, I 
hope to publish studies that deal with the never-ending justification of authoritarianism of Turkey. 
194   Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, “Tek Parti ve Demokrasi,” Cumhuriyet, 24 Apr 1998, as in Ben Demokrat 
Değilim, p. 104; Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 231; Ergün Aybars, Atatürk, Çağdaşlaşma ve Laik 
Demokrasi, p. 57 and 62; Anıl Çeçen, 100 Soruda Kemalizm, p. 182.      
195   Erik Jan Zürcher, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 141. 
196   Ibid, p. 152. 
197   Ibid, p. 145. 
198   Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 46. 
199   Ahmet Demirel, Tek Partinin İktidarı, p. 73. 
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enact any precautions that are not rooted in general (natural) law200 shows deep 
foresight. 
 As I've already pointed out in the previous chapter, and will again address in the 
rest of this work, it is often assumed in the Kemalist historiography that Mustafa Kemal 
wanted democracy (and that opposition parties attest to his intentions) but the country 
was not ready both because the revolution had not yet been internalized and because 
socio-economic conditions were not ripe. This assertion and the tutelage single-party 
theory are mutually supportive and has been repeated multiple times in the Kemalist 
literature.201 However, the entrenched tutelage single-party theory is not at all 
convincing, and that there can hardly be found any evidence to suggest that Mustafa 
Kemal desired genuine democracy. It is often the case to quote speeches of Mustafa 
Kemal to prove his democratic intentions,202 but as Sevan Nişanyan rightly argues, not 
intentions, but actions must be taken into consideration203 and the actions of Atatürk -
either as to TPCF or SCF- can hardly be taken as democratic. 
  Before going to the next phase -relating the course between 1919 and 1930 from 
exponents of single-party- I would like to summarize what I've been discussing in this 
chapter. One of the things done to justify the single-party regime of Turkey is to 
denigrate the opposition both before and after the proclamation of Turkish Republic. 
According to this story, Atatürk and Turkish Republic aimed a multi-party democracy, 
but it was because of the faults of the parties themselves that they were suppressed. 
Again according to this story, Atatürk's allowing for opposition attests to his democratic 
intentions, and his aim for creating a multi-party republic.  
 Unfortunately, this whole story seems incongruous because of several reasons: It 
is very dubious that SCF can be accepted as a political party. It is also not sensible to 
identify the dissidents as “reactionaries” or “Ottomanists” because not only their own 
documents do not confirm this story, but this assertion is not based on any substantial 
material. The assertion that Turkish Republic was planned as a democracy and that 
TPCF and SCF constitute its attempts at a multi-party system is not cogent, too. One of 
them (SCF) is a loyal opposition, and not an organized attempt by the opponents 
themselves, and that the other (TPCF) should better be accepted as the de facto end of 
                                                
200   Mahmut Goloğlu, Devrimler ve Tepkileri, p. 93 
201   The following can be typical examples of this assertion: Şevket Süreyya Aydemir and Ahmet 
Mumcu (cited in Cemil Koçak, Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası, p. 98 and 111); Ergun Özbudun, “Atatürk 
ve Demokrasi,” as in Atatürkçü Düşünce El Kitabı, p. 120-122.   
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organized opposition rather than an “attempt for democracy.” The bottom line is that, all 
these assertions -that the opposition were reactionaries, that opposition parties were 
attempt for democracy, that the time was not favorable because revolution had not yet 
reached the masses etc.- were invented later to justify and legitimize the single-party 
domination, and are by no means convincing. 
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“From A to Z, everything we have is broken” Refik Saydam 
 
 
V.	  What	  Happened	  During	  the	  Early	  Republican	  Period,	  and	  How	  it	  is	  
Narrated:	  Kemalist/apologist	  Accounts	  vs.	  Realists	  
 
 The primary objective of this work is to indicate how single-party rule of Turkey 
is justified by stating that what happened was due to “conditions of the era.” Whereas 
all the chapters hitherto have focused on the theocratical explanations used in justifying 
the single party regime -transition from subject to citizenship (chapter I); inter-war 
authoritarianism effecting Turkey (chapter II); Turkey's unique conditions or 
modernization process (Chapter III); and reactionary opposition (Chapter IV)- this 
chapter will bear a different stance. While taking into consideration everything I've 
counted so far, I will directly portray how the revolutions and reforms in the early 
republican period are depicted. In doing so, I will resort to both Kemalist and non-
Kemalist accounts to unfurl  the obvious distinction which gave rise to this thesis in the 
first place.  
 Let me elucidate what I mean above: History can be told from several different 
points of view, and as John Arnold rightly argues, “historians inevitably decide which 
things can or should be said.”204 As I've beheld while scouring the Kemalist accounts, 
when it comes to relating the single-party period (and the process leading up to it) there 
is one thing conspicuous: To identify the Ottoman Empire and its whole cultural and 
social structure as antiquated, hence paving the way for  the exigency of revolutions. 
I've basically dealt with this item separately above (in the 1st and 3rd  chapters), but what 
I will do in this chapter is a bit different: I will give examples (direct statements) from 
accounts that are advocating single-party rule to demonstrate that in these accounts, 
there is an overall inclination to find plausible causes for most actions of Atatürk, both 
before and after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic. 
 As I will give several examples below, there is a general tendency in the 
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Kemalist historiography to not only relate what happened, but also either trying to come 
up with possible explanations (if the case involves some kind of purge or violent action 
against the dissidents), or relating what happened with a predicative statement (if the 
case is a reform that is reckoned  positive, such as reforming the university). I will give 
examples below from Kemalist figures such as Ergün Aybars, Suna Kili, Şerafettin 
Turan and Anıl Çeçen, and then from figures such as Cemil Koçak, Ahmet Demirel and 
Mete Tunçay, whom I like to address as realists. This chapter can be thought of a very 
basic discourse analysis. My main aim is to show that phrases such as “necessary, 
exigency, imperative, inevitable, prerequisite” are overwhelmingly used by Kemalist 
figures to justify Atatürk revolutions, whose main aim was to get rid of “backwards, 
reactionary, outdated” Ottoman institutions.       
 While discussing how the languages of Kemalist and non-Kemalist accounts 
vary, I will focus on 3 points: The necessity/exigency of the revolutions, the 
antiquity/outdatedness of the Ottoman culture and the claim that to achieve assets like 
democracy or modernization, there is the need for nation state and/or revolutions. This 
categorization I've just made might seem elusive at first, but I hope to make it clear in 
the following paragraphs. 
 Atatürk revolutions are mostly emblazoned and also deemed necessary by 
exponents of single-party regime, and I will now cite examples from 3 names, Anıl 
Çeçen, Sina Akşin and Şerafettin Turan, the last one being a name I have not mentioned 
earlier in this work. According to Çeçen, “to create a modern country in Turkey, a 
revolution in the field of law seemed compulsory 205” and “because multi structure came 
to an end, it was necessary to do away with different education systems.”206 Likewise, 
according to Şerafettin Turan, it was necessary to ban augury (fortune telling) sorcery, 
and exorcism which were things Islam did not affirm but reviled .207  
 From the necessity of the revolutions, let us now come to the backwards, 
reactionary, outdated structure of the Ottoman Empire. There is again a general 
proclivity presented by the advocates of single-party that -be it about law, education, 
economy, politics etc.- the institutions of the Ottoman Empire and/or the items used in 
the everyday life of the Ottoman society are outdated, and therefore had to be reformed. 
Suna Kili claims that “tarboosh...is the ridiculed and dilapidated image of an outdated 
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206   Ibid, p. 105.  
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lifestyle”208 and that the tekkes (Islamic monastery) and zawiyas had become houses for 
bigotry that have nothing to do with religion and in which all kinds of factiousness, 
engrossing and sordidness were carried out.209 As for the Darü'l-fünun (former Istanbul 
University founded in 1900 by Abdulhamid II); Anıl Çeçen210 and Sina Akşin211 both 
identify it as an outdated institution, and the former argues that to reform it, a 
revolutionary enterprise was necessary. In addition, Suna Kili identifies the ezan being 
recited in Arabic in Bursa in 1933 as a “reactionary” action.212 Finally, Ergün Aybars 
identifies the social and economic situation of Turkey in 1923, when the Republic was 
proclaimed as “with one word, horrible.”213 
 It is often the case that when discussing the Atatürk revolutions, we hear phrases 
such as “without X, you can not have Y,” and I should note here that this approach is 
still prevalent in Turkey, whether the subject is Atatürk revolutions or not. I will now 
cite examples from the aforementioned historians, to demonstrate how Atatürk 
revolutions as a whole or in part, are deemed necessary to achieve certain assets. Anıl 
Çeçen argues that to establish a modern nation state, it was necessary that sultanate be 
proscribed.214 He goes to argue that for the republic to progress, caliphate had to be 
abolished,215 and that to become a nation state, a certain enculturation  was necessary.216 
Suna Kili argues that revolutions are the imperative for development, change and 
modernization,217 and that for modernization, nation state is a prerequisite.218 Finally, 
according to Ergün Aybars, who claims that to realize democracy, there should be 
national unity, economic base, inner peace and cultural accumulation,219 political multi-
party life should not be expected to be realized within the revolution process.220  
 I should reiterate my main aim in this chapter, and make clear why I've quoted 
the above mentioned statements. Within the advocates of single-party regime, there is a 
general proclivity to praise Atatürk revolutions. However, merely citing the revolutions 
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are often not enough, and this brings itself the persistence to create a necessity for the 
revolutions, and to denigrate the previous structure, the Ottoman Empire. As I will show 
the contrast now, in the non-Kemalist accounts -which again I should say that I will 
address as realists- this desire to find ground for the revolutions can not be observed.    
 An important step within the process Mustafa Kemal builds his personal 
dominance is in 1922, when the parliament proposes a law draft which apparently 
aimed at deactivating Mustafa Kemal by proposing that people who did not abide for 
five years in a precinct within Turkey or who were born outside of Turkey would not 
become congressmen. While the intention to get rid of Mustafa Kemal seems salient 
here, a closer look at how this is narrated might give us clue as to difference of style by 
Kemalist and non-Kemalist figures. Ahmet Demirel narrates what happened, citing the 
parliament records,221 and Cemil Koçak summarizes the deliberations.222 Bu when it 
again, comes to Suna Kili, she addresses this as a “document of malice, a bitter 
memory,” also pointing out that the speech Mustafa Kemal gives in return for this law 
draft should be “unforgettable,” identifying his speech as “describing what treachery act 
could be taken given all his national objectives and triumphs.”223 It is true that Koçak, 
too, identifies this as “an open thrust  against the subject of Mustafa Kemal,”224 which it 
is.225 But identifying this law draft with the words “malice” and/or “treachery” is 
suggestive; it makes it clear that anything Mustafa Kemal does will be defended, and 
the opposite will be condemned. Within relating this law draft, Kili is not finished with 
her panegyric of Mustafa Kemal and condemnation of his dissidents. She goes on: 
 
This draft has revealed another fact. There are people in the parliament 
who has worked with Mustafa Kemal since the first day...but who are 
malicious enough to do every evil...It will be thought that in every new 
election these are expelled, but this won't prevent same kind of people 
from coming into the parliament with the new election. From the first 
days onwards the existence and behaviour of these people could not be 
prevented. This is in one way inevitable. As long as revolutionist, faithful 
people will be vigilant, consistent and determined.226 
                                                
221   Ahmet Demirel, Birinci Meclis'te Muhalefet, p. 516-525. 
222   Cemil Koçak, as in Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye Volume IV, p. 130. 
223   Suna Kili, Türk Devrim Tarihi, p. 200. 
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This whole excerpt speaks for itself, and in one way makes the linchpin of this chapter. 
Mustafa Kemal is a revolutionary figure and what he does is unassailable. His actions 
will incontestably produce good results so they should not be opposed. Any kind of 
opposition in this regard, means treachery, contains evil. Opposition against Mustafa 
Kemal can not be accepted. This is more or less the stance of Kemalist historiography, 
and Suna Kili, in the above-quoted excerpt, presents a par excellence example of it. 
Mind you, by stating that in every new election, malicious people are coming back, Kili 
also paves the way for justifying single-party rule, and for condemning and purging any 
further opposition. Kili does not think that it is the right of people to oppose to Mustafa 
Kemal; on the contrary, by identifying the action of Mustafa Kemal as sacred, she is 
claiming again and again that the dissenters have bad intentions. 
 I would like to go on portraying how the revolutions are presented by realist 
historians. In the chapter “Political History (1923-1950)” from Turkish History series, 
Cemil Koçak summarizes -under the sub-heading of Kemalist Revolutions- all the 
revolutions of Atatürk within 3 pages.227 While his style is succinct, Koçak does not 
make any attempt to justify the revolutions, nor to disparage them. He one by one 
describes all the reforms or revolutions, and if they have any significant results (such as 
people executed in the end as in the hat reform) he relates these. The same thing goes 
for Ahmet Demirel, too, who in his book Tek Partinin İktidarı recounts the whole 
process between 1923-1946. Again like Koçak, his style is as close as one can be in 
relating what happened as it happened.228     
 The same thing goes for Mete Tunçay, Erik Jan Zürcher and Ayşe Hür, too. The 
common denominator that brings all these names together is that, unlike Kemalist 
accounts busy with stating the necessity of the revolutions and celebrating them -
meanwhile denigrating their Ottoman counterparts- these names not only basically 
relate what happened, but emphasize that all the revolutions and the revolutionary 
tribunals this or that way served for the suppression of the opposition in the society.229 
For instance, it might be instructive to compare Suna Kili who feels the need to tell that 
tarboosh was a “ridiculed” item used in an “outdated” society and Zürcher, Tunçay and 
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Hür who feel the need to state that around 600 people were executed because of 
objecting to the hat law, which Kili does not even mention.230 
 I should add here that figures like Suna Kili do not just put forward their own 
opinion while arguing that tarboosh is a token of backwardness. It is known from 
Atatürk's numerous speeches and telegraphs that he identifies the general garment of 
Ottoman society as backwardness and covets for the garment of the West. But again, 
this Orientalist and Euro-centric attitude of Atatürk is not peculiar to him, and there is a 
reason why he came out to develop such a weltanschauung.  
 In 1908, Mustafa Kemal is on his way to Tripoli and on the way, the ferry stops 
in Sicily. When he is in a carriage, a group of Sicilians throw lemon skins to this “alien 
with tarboosh.” Later while relating this event, Mustafa Kemal says that he was pissed 
off not because of the impertinence of the Sicilian boys, but because of “being captive 
to such an alienated headgear.” In 1912, Mustafa Kemal is in France, during the time of 
Picardie military manoeuvres. While discussing with European specialists, Mustafa 
Kemal takes an opposite stance, making the audience sneer at him. When it is 
understood the next day during the manoeuvres that Mustafa Kemal was right, a foreign 
colonel says: It was obvious from the previous night that you were right but so long as 
you wear this flaky headgear, nobody will respect what is in it.231 I should add here that 
in Exupery's most celebrated novel, The Little Prince, a parallel incident is related -
where an astronomer from Turkey discovers a new planet in 1909 but is discounted 
because of his outfit- and the Orientalist attitude is tacitly criticized by Exupery.232 The 
common denominator that brings together all these is that it is true that at least some 
Europeans find Ottoman (and perhaps Eastern) outfit ridiculous and this stance of theirs 
even effects their though on what is inside the outfit. But there is a serious problem here 
that needs to be addressed.  
 As I've stated in chapter II where I am discussing interwar European 
authoritarianism, the racist and Orientalist attitudes of Europeans can not and should not 
                                                
230   How many people were executed because of hat reform is a controversial issue, and I will not 
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constitute grounds for Orientalist revolutions and reforms of Turkey. Arguing against 
Zafer Toprak, I have discussed earlier that the main reason for head skull measurements 
were the Europeans' identifying Turkey as yellow race. The same thing applies for this 
tarboosh example, too. It is obvious that a group of Sicilian boys or European 
specialists' mocking Atatürk's outfit is a racist and Euro-centric action, and this racist 
actions should not be avenged by forcing hat reform on the masses. If it is the Western 
civilization of which you want to be a part, the main action to take should be the 
establishment of political parties or free press; not forcing people a new garment which 
is alien to them. A wrong reaction by racist or Orientalist figures is avenged years later 
by equally Euro-centric and Orientalist actions! It is no surprise that the hostile tone 
Atatürk has against the Ottoman garment is dubbed in the Kemalist figures such as Suna 
Kili. According to Kili, “people are not civilized by their beliefs and thoughts...their 
appearance and outfit are related with being civilized,”233 because according to Atatürk, 
“It was mandatory to get rid of tarboosh because it sat on our heads as token of 
nescience and bigotry, and hate for every kind of development.”234 
 I've discussed throughout this chapter that within the Kemalist literature, there is 
an overabundance of finding reasons for Atatürk revolutions and identifying his actions 
as necessary. While this attitude is obviously subjective, and is very prone to 
exploitation, whether there is some truth in them should be questioned as well. For 
instance, one can easily argue that changing Ottoman style of measure units with their 
Western counterparts, did help in the Westernization of Turkey, and if the aim is to 
Westernize the country, perhaps their benefits can be stressed, though not addressing 
them as imperative. However, there are some cases where even the subjective premise 
(reasons) for Atatürk revolutions lack logic, and I want to finish this chapter by 
addressing a few of them.  
 In her book, Türk Devrim Tarihi, Suna Kili seems to be successful in coming up 
with the desired reasoning for almost all the revolutions of Atatürk. Under the 
subheading of “A New Alphabet,” Kili argues  in the opening sentence that one of the 
most important things for a society is language unity, that each individual speak the 
same language and that it is understood by everyone.235 However, for a number of 
societies, the case is different. For instance, it might be educative to compare which one 
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is more modern and civilized: Turkey, where Turkish is forced on the minorities as the 
official language, or Switzerland, where at least two languages (German and France) are 
spoken. This perhaps would go for the abolishment of sultanate, too. Anıl Çeçen argues 
that to be a nation-state, sultanate had to be abolished.236 In this regard, comparing 
Turkey and several European states where still monarchy -though symbolically- is 
applied can be instructive: Spain, Wales, England and Holland, jut to mention a few.    
 
“O, wind, if winter comes, can spring be far behind?” P. B. Shelley  
 
VI.	  Conclusion:	  Towards	  leaving	  apologetic	  historiography	  behind...	  
 
 Imagine you are invited to a TV program as an expert historian to discuss the 
single-party period of Turkey with other historians who more or less have Kemalist 
outlooks. It is very likely that, whatever kind of criticism you bring to the period 
between 1925-1946, your collocutor will answer with only one phrase: Conditions of 
the period. It is very likely that, when you are referring to the single-party period and 
bringing stricture to any of its practices -be it lack of democracy, Independence 
Tribunals, executions, dissolution of opposition parties etc- your opponent will tell you 
that the single-party period should be evaluated by taking the conditions of the period 
into consideration. The one and only purpose of this thesis is to question and challenge 
this ever-present postulation, and to prove that single-party period and its practices can 
not be justified or defended with this fallacious premise. My giving the example of a 
TV program here might sound weird, but this is not something hypothetical; I've 
witnessed this situation numerous times in Turkey. In this final chapter, I will go over 
all the assumptions of single party exponents, and also by taking this discussion to 
different levels, will hopefully show why they lack substantial evidence.  
 The whole idea behind the argument that the single-party period was due to 
conditions is mainly based on several fallacious premises: That there was nothing left 
out of the Ottoman Empire (evocation of the “subject to citizen” assumption of chapter 
I) and that Atatürk had to modernize a backward and collapsed nation, meanwhile 
aiming democracy in the long run (discussed in chapter III). Added to these main 
premises is that Turkey had her unique conditions which made it impossible to have a 
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democratic regime (again, chapter III) and that since inter-war European states had 
succumbed to authoritarianism and failed to embrace democracy, Atatürk's less 
authoritarian single- party regime should be perceived as normal (discussed in chapter 
II). In addition, because opposition -whether organized or individual- was subsumed 
without any substantial legal reason, the ones who hold on to the “conditions of the era” 
argument must denigrate any kind of opposition against Atatürk (discussed in chapter 
IV). I will go over all of these one by one, and try to place them within the big picture.  
 I discussed in chapter I that there is this assumption that Turkish Republic meant 
from transition from subject to citizen and tried to show why it lacks factual evidence. I 
argued that -although limited- there was a certain degree of pluralism (although not real 
democracy in the sense we know today) in the Ottoman Empire, and so the 
proclamation of Turkish Republic can not mean transition from subject to citizen. Now 
I would like to draw attention to a different point of the situation to prove why this 
claim of transition from subject to citizen is totally incongruous. I argued that there was 
a limited pluralism starting from 1908, but for a second, let us assume that this is not 
true. Let us presume for a second that all the 600 years of the Ottoman Empire was 
dominated by the Sultan and agree with the Kemalist mainstream premise that the 
people of the Empire were really subjects, and were not at all close to being a citizen. 
This, still would not justify the single-party rule, because -taking into consideration that 
after WWI, there was an upsurge of parliamentary democracies- a nation established 
after World War One would be expected to have pluralism. Besides, the 1920 elections 
and the parliament opened on 23rd April, 1920, would make it clear that when Turkish 
Republic was proclaimed, the very society which declared that republic had experienced 
pluralism between 1920-1923. Let us now elucidate this point. 
 Emre Kongar argues in his book Atatürk that the parliament which was 
inefficient during the last stage of the Ottoman Empire was rendered efficient by 
Atatürk.237 The parliament he refers to is surely the one opened on 23rd April, 1920. I 
should remind that this date is also celebrated in Turkey every year, with the motto of 
Atatürk, “sovereignty belongs to the nation.” If Atatürk, as Kongar argues, rendered that 
parliament efficient -and as both Kemalist and non-Kemalists agree, it is a parliament 
that bears congressmen from all walks of life- it should be accepted that from than on, 
that very parliament can speak on behalf of the nation, hence introducing pluralism, 
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even if it had not been present at all during the last stage of the Ottoman Empire. The 
bottom line here is that, it is a great dilemma to celebrate 23rd April, the date the 
parliament was opened as manifestation of sovereignty of the people, and also to argue 
that Turkish Republic meant transition from subject to citizen.  
 I should reiterate my concern I argued in chapter I as to fetishizing Ottoman 
pluralism once more. Arguing that there was limited pluralism from 1908 onwards does 
not necessarily mean that there was democracy in the Ottoman Empire in the sense we 
know today. I am only arguing against the postulation that Turkish Republic created 
citizen from subject, and that needed a transition process. What I am saying is that a) 
there was limited pluralism in the Ottoman Empire and a lively cultural and social life 
starting from 1908, and b) Even if it hadn't existed, we could not argue that there was a 
necessity for single-party period, for a nation established after WWI would be expected 
to have pluralism. Arguing that there was limited pluralism in the Ottoman Empire 
should also not lead us to ignore that, following the first elections in 1908, that 
pluralism was placed by a virtual single-party period when the CUP became 
authoritarian. As Zürcher argues, Turkish state's being turned into a single-party regime 
in 1925 is close to CUP's declaring its virtual single-party hegemony.238 In this respect, 
we can easily say that the pluralism in 1908 was short-lived, as was the limited 
pluralism before 1925. Still, this should not make one defend single-party rule with the 
motto of “conditions of the era.” Looking at Turkey today (in 2014) and when we 
compare it with periods of 1908-1912 or 1950-1957 perhaps we can assume that 
democracy or pluralism has always been temporary in Turkey, and rather than being an 
end in itself, it has always been means to reach the end. Perhaps we can say that 
absolute power absolutely corrupts, or that popular support from bottom to top might 
yield in authoritarianism, as argued by Hanioğlu.239 
 The argument that Turkey's single-party period should be considered normal 
when compared with fascist and totalitarian inter-war regimes is not cogent in two 
ways, as I fully discussed in chapter II. The first problem is that, while it is true that 
inter-war Europe period saw the rise of totalitarian regimes, it should not be forgotten 
that it first saw the rise of democracies, and that Turkish Republic -as a new nation-
state- was turned into a single-party state in 1925, when the majority of European 
nations were enjoying pluralism, and had not yet experienced authoritarian/totalitarian 
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leaders. The second problem is that, even if we accept for a moment that inter-war 
Europe was characterized by totalitarianism, Turkish single-party state still can not be 
accepted normal, because odious examples such as Hitler Germany, Mussolini Italy or 
Franco Spain can not be cited as examples to be influenced by. When historians state 
that the Turkey of inter-war Europe was influenced by totalitarian regimes, as Zafer 
Toprak does,240 or that Turkey would make its preference at a time most European 
states were opting for totalitarianism, as Ergün Aybars does,241 they seem to forget that 
the regimes which they claim Turkey was influenced by, are regimes today remembered 
with disgust and hate. The bottom line here is that, if today a German is not trying to 
justify the Nazi period by citing Italian fascism as an example to be influenced by, a 
Turkish should not do it, too.  
 I have discussed above whether Turkey's being influenced by fascist and 
totalitarian regimes of Europe can be accepted as an excuse for the single-party regime. 
I think a note is necessary here, on discussing whether Turkey of Atatürk was fascist or 
not. Whether Turkish single-party was fascist or not is controversial. My aim in this 
thesis is only to argue whether the conditions necessitated single-party domination, and 
whether it was fascist or not is not directly related to my topic. Yet, I will point out a 
few points of view, and basically present my own opinion. I don't think Turkish single-
party could be identified as fascist, mainly because it lacks popular support, which is 
indispensable for fascism (which comes from the Italian word fasces meaning a bundle 
of axes, symbolizing unitary and solidarity). It should not be forgotten that, in his 
fifteen-year-presidency as the head of a single-party state, Atatürk was never welcomed 
as Mussolini did after his famous march on Rome. In addition, we can hardly have a 
photo of Atatürk resembling that of Hitler speaking in Nuremberg to the numbed 
masses. Apart from that, Turkish single-party is absent of irredentism and 
expansionism, entities that are mostly found in fascist regimes.   
 People who often identify Turkish single-party as fascist might be doing it based 
on Cumhuriyet journal's infamous title “Greetings from Kemalist Turkey to the Fascist 
Italy” and on the statements of certain congressmen such as Recep Peker that promote 
Italian fascism (which he did), but these alone, are not enough to pin the fascist 
minimum label on Kemalist Turkey. Zürcher, too, argues that while there are obvious 
similarities between fascist regimes and Turkey (extreme nationalism, legitimizing 
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historical mythology and authoritarian character of the regime), differences are greater 
than similarities (lack of irredentism and lack of popular support in Turkey and 
semblance of a democratic system). Tanıl Bora, too, argues that Turkish single-party 
was authoritarian in fact at times totalitarian, but it lacked the proper substructure to 
sustain fascism.242 Finally, Stanley Payne , who is known for his studies about fascism, 
does not include Turkey in his article “Fascism: A Working Definition,” where he 
draws a chart that contain 15 countries.243      
 Turkey's unique and/or unfavorable conditions, when combined with the 
modernization paradigm, seem suitable to justify the single-party regime, but there are 
again, several problems here (as I discussed in chapter III). The postulation that Turkey 
had her unique conditions so traditional solutions such as parliament, democracy, 
elections etc. would not be suitable for her is not at all convincing, for it is too vague 
and susceptible for exploitation. Any given country at any given time can have unique 
conditions. In fact, this claim of exceptionalism is so elusive, that any government eager 
to suppress any kind of opposition can exploit this to apply her own agenda. It is strange 
that Anıl Çeçen uses this “unique conditions” claim in his book promiscuously (at least 
13 times!),244 but never making an attempt to explain it. What is meant by unique 
conditions is vague, and if it is for instance, being a peninsula or housing minorities, 
there are enough countries in Europe to fit this description. If Turkey can cite for her 
unique conditions, being surrounded by sea from 3 sides; the Italians, the French or the 
Spanish can do that, too. If Turkey can cite having minorities for unique conditions, 
more than a quarter of the countries in Europe can do the same thing. 
 This unique conditions argument is sometimes intertwined with Turkey's 
unfavorable conditions (as I fully discussed in chapter III), and when the modernization 
paradigm is applied, it seems that Turkey's single-party period can be justified. Here, we 
can incorporate the debate of transition from subject to citizen (the material of chapter I) 
too, because Turkey's conditions in 1923, when Republic is proclaimed, in the words of 
Ergün Aybars is “horrible.”245 So the argument can go as follows: Single party period 
can be justified because when the Turkish Republic was proclaimed, people of Turkey 
were not subjects but citizens, and that since the conditions of the country were terrible, 
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it had to go through a modernization process. 
 Why all the arguments in the previous paragraph are not convincing is simple: A  
state founded after World War One would be expected to experience pluralism, and not 
governed by single-party. When you admit that a society founded in the 20th century is 
expected to experience pluralism, all the arguments of single-party advocates I've 
discussed in the 70 pages so far become hard to accept. Neither transition from subject 
to citizen, nor inter-war Europe authoritarianism, nor Turkey's unique and/or 
unfavorable conditions nor opposition against Atatürk's reactionary character... None of 
these can be justified, when one admits that Turkey was established in the beginning of 
the 20th century, at a time not authoritarianism but pluralism was the coin of the realm. 
Let me elucidate this point, because if one is only reading this final chapter, what I'm 
saying might seem weird.  
 I've been discussing in this thesis whether Turkey's single-party period can be 
justified by asserting that conditions of the era entailed so. In order to this, I've 
summarized in the first 4 chapters all the arguments of single-party proponents and tried 
to show why I don't find them convincing. I've said that subject to citizen claim is 
incongruous because late Ottoman State enjoyed a limited kind of pluralism and the 
period following Tanzimat was a lively one where the definition of citizenship made its 
way into textbooks; I've asserted that inter-war Europe authoritarianism is incongruous 
because 1920's saw rise of pluralism, and not authoritarianism; I've argued that Turkey's 
unique/unfavorable conditions and the modernization paradigm can not justify Turkish 
single party state because it is an Orientalist and Euro-centric point of view (and I gave 
the example of German Sonderweg); and finally I've objected to the argument that 
opposition against Atatürk bore reactionary characteristics and I gave the example of 
both TPCF and SCF, both of which were established by Atatürk's fellow soldiers and/or 
close friends. I will now take this thing to a whole different level and argue why as a 
whole, this “conditions of the period” argument does not seem cogent.  
 My intention for embarking on this project in the first place was, to argue that 
unlike the putative assertion, single-party period of Turkey can not be legitimized with 
the reason that conditions of the period necessitated what was done. I have analyzed in 
the first 4 chapters certain postulations and offered alternative explanations to refute 
them, but what I am saying now is that, the postulation that Turkey went through the 
single-party period because conditions necessitated it is fallacious, regardless of its 
subheadings. Let me state this without prevaricating: The postulation that single-party 
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rule was due to conditions is invented in order to prevent the questioning of the 
founding philosophy of the state and thereby, question what Atatürk, Turkey's national 
hero did. It is not that the two decks of historians I've challenged in this work look at the 
real conditions and defend single-party period accordingly; but it is rather that they try 
to present the conditions in such a way that they will justify the single-party rule. It is 
not that Toktamış Ateş is deducing that single-party period can be justified because 
Ottoman people were subjects, and with republic, they became citizens.246 But it is 
rather Ateş has already decided to justify and legitimize single-party rule, so he tries to 
come up with plausible reasons, and the one reason he can find is that Ottoman society 
was a theocratic one and its citizens were subjects, and that Turkish republic realized 
this transition from subject to citizen. 
 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı has once averred that, asking why Atatürk did not establish 
1990's style British democracy in 1923, in a medieval society is just like asking why 
Mehmed the Conqueror did not establish a telephone network while sieging 
Constantinople.247 I will spend some time analyzing this statement, because it subsumes 
majority of the premises I've discussed and challenged in this thesis. Kışlalı is obviously 
stating that establishing a telephone network in 1453 -almost four centuries before it 
was actually invented- is similar to allowing a nation established in 1923 to have 
pluralism. While this premise is utterly weak, I need to go even deeper to discuss why it 
is so. First of all, telephone is an object that has to be invented, which is even a further 
step than discovery. Democracy, on the other hand is in its most basic sense, changing 
of ruling power freely, without any pressure, and this is not an invention. Since human 
beings discovered during the times of the Ancient Greece that rulers of societies can be 
elected, different societies in different parts of the world have applied different levels of 
democracy. To apply a limited kind of democracy in a society, no scientific invention 
whatsoever is necessary. This also brings us back to the question of modernization 
theory, which envisages, as I discussed in chapter III, that eastern societies should 
follow western societies, and that in this transition period from traditionalism to 
modernization, a period of coercion can be observed. This also incorporates all the “a 
must” premises by single party advocates; that for the development of Turkish 
Republic, the abolition of the Caliphate was a must, as argued by Anıl Çeçen,248 or that 
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revolutions are a must for modernization, as argued by Suna Kili.249         
 The assertion of Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, that establishing telephone network during 
the siege of Constantinople is similar to establishing democracy in the 1920's is 
important because it portrays  another problem which should be addressed. Establishing 
democracy means tolerating pluralism, and to do that all Atatürk had to do was to allow 
for free elections. When Kışlalı presents the matter with the words “saying that Atatürk 
did not establish democracy,” it might be perceived as if Atatürk had to embark on any 
special project to attain the level of democracy. But in fact, the problem is utterly 
simple: The elections that were done between 1908-1920, though intermittently, would 
continue, that's it. The comparison Kışlalı does is with Mehmed the Conqueror's 
establishing telephone network, which was something that had to be invented first. But 
democracy, or pluralism as I would like to put it, had already been there since 1908, at 
times present, at times subdued. The bottom line is that, Kışlalı not only fails to see that 
Atatürk did not have to do anything to provide pluralism; but he ignores the fact that 
Atatürk's action destroyed that mechanism of pluralism. 
 I've argued above that, regardless of its subheading, “conditions of the era” 
argument is incongruous, because a state founded in 1920's is expected to be ruled with 
pluralism. Here, I want to draw attention to a very interesting point: The ones who are 
actually aware of this more than anybody else, are single-party proponents. They are 
aware of it, because in almost all the accounts I've fathomed and challenged in this 
thesis, there is this constant attempt to explain and substantiate lack of democracy 
during single-party period. There is a reason why Ergün Aybars insists that “Turkish 
Revolution can not be understood without taking into consideration the conditions 
Turkey had when the republic was established”250 and that “for a democracy, there has 
to be certain conditions.”251 Aybars is talking about lack of democracy in the early 
republic period of Turkey, because its absence is unflattering. Aybars is trying to 
explain and justify lack of democracy in the period between 1925-1946, because it is the 
opposite of what is expected. Lack of something -unless the argument is theological- is 
only explained when its absence creates problems. Let us scour all the Ottoman History 
literature, and I bet we can hardly find a source that will try to explain lack of 
democracy in the reign of Suleiman the Lawmaker or Murad IV. It is because at that 
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time, probably not many people expected pluralism in the Ottoman Empire. But since 
the late Ottoman Empire and also the time between 1920-1925 witnessed different 
degrees of pluralism, that very pluralism is expected after the proclamation of the 
Republic, too. And since single-party proponents know this, they take great pains in 
explaining why Turkey of Atatürk lacked democracy. It should be no surprise for us that 
from Toktamış Ateş to Ergün Aybars, from Suna Kili to Nurşen Mazıcı, majority of the 
single party advocates start their accounts by saying that we can not understand the 
single-party period without taking the conditions of the period into consideration.  
 There is this phrase in Turkey that goes as, “If it hadn't been for Atatürk...”252 I 
can guess that, if this thesis gets published, some historians will accuse me of being 
ungrateful and I will be targeted with sentences starting with “If it hadn't been for 
Atatürk” and probably going on as “you wouldn't be able to write this thesis.” Zürcher, 
too, makes an assumption that “it is doubtful whether Turkey would have survived as an 
independent state without his unique combination of tactical mastery, ruthlessness, 
realism and sense of purpose.”253 There can be a great deal of truth in this statement of 
Zürcher. For one thing, it could be argued that Turkey could not have repossessed 
Anatolia without Atatürk's leadership in the National Struggle. It can also be argued that 
if free elections had been allowed, there would be a two party state, paving the way for 
a possible civil war. But these can hardly go beyond being hypothesis. Perhaps it can 
also be thought that with free elections and a two party state, Turkey would sustain a 
mature democracy, but again this, can not go beyond being a hypothesis. Atatürk can be 
“absolutely the right man on the right spot during the greatest crisis of his country,”254 
to quote from Zürcher. Nevertheless, this should not allow us to assume that his turning 
Turkey into a single-party regime was the right thing to do when the conditions are 
taken into consideration.    
 Earlier in this thesis, I gave the examples of historians who did not think 
democracy can grow in Eastern societies like Turkey, and I stated that combined with 
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the modernization paradigm which makes a clear distinction between traditional and 
modern societies, this argument might be used to justify single-party period. If we 
identify Ottoman Empire as a traditional and monolithic society with no dynamics, and 
the Turkey after Atatürk Revolution as a modern society, than the modernization 
paradigm fits Turkey. Add to this the Turkish single-party period as the inevitable 
coercive period envisaged by the modernization process to turn the traditional society 
into a modern one, and you have your legitimized Kemalist single-party, as would be 
lauded by historians like Toktamış Ateş or Suna Kili. But as I discussed, the 
modernization paradigm was developed by the Western societies for the Eastern 
societies and it fails to capture the essence of development. For one thing with its 
woman organizations, somewhat free elections, free press and lively political and social 
atmosphere, the Ottoman Society in 1900's can not be treated the same as the Ottoman 
Society in 1700's. But here, I would like to take this argument to a different level.  
 Bernard Lewis is one of the historians to embrace modernization paradigm and 
giving the example of Sweden -a Western society that did not go through the same 
afflictions as Turkey did- Lewis identifies the democratization process of Turkey as 
“radiant.”255 Here, the question of Orientalism and Euro-centricism are included in the 
big picture. Lewis argues in his illustrious book What Went Wrong that societies, in 
times of trouble, give two kinds of reaction: “What went wrong?” and “Who did this to 
us?” Using historical evidence, Lewis argues that, while Western societies are likely to 
ask the first question, Eastern societies are more prone to the second one (still, Lewis 
admits that Ottomans did ask “what went wrong” and searched for the causes of their 
decline). The content of Lewis's ground breaking study might not be directly relevant to 
my subject, but its Orientalist attitude is surely useful in this context. Hypothetically 
speaking, looking at 15 Eastern societies and trying to understand whether democracy 
or authoritarianism was embraced there, is different than claiming that if democracy had 
not been embraced, it was because of the conditions of the era. We can look at all the 
Middle Eastern societies, and deduce that none of them was ever successful in 
sustaining a democratic regime. But this, will not allow us to look at one particular 
Middle Eastern and/or Moslem society at a certain time and contend that democracy did 
not grow there because the conditions were not ripe. In identifying the general pattern of 
reactions of societies in times of trouble, Lewis might be every right that Eastern 
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societies act differently than the Western ones. But again, this will not allow us to argue 
that, if in Turkey -as a Middle Eastern and Moslem society- democracy did not flourish 
in 1920's and 30's, this was due to the conditions of the era.   
 In this thesis, I've analyzed and argued against approximately 20 historians, 
whom I jointly refer to as single-party exponents. I should say something as to how I 
made this choice (how I decided whom to include in the thesis) and I feel the need to 
single-out one of them and thereby, take this debate to a further level. While making the 
decision whom to include, I basically tried to select eminent and illustrious names. My 
objecting to all these distinguished names jointly should not and will not decrease their 
academic value. On the contrary, it is with the help of these acclaimed historians that we 
budding historians learn about Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic (it should not be 
forgotten that without Halil İnalcık -who is a single-party exponent- Ottoman Empire 
studies would be very different, and perhaps difficult). With no exception, all the names 
I've referred and objected to in my thesis have the academic title of professor. Most of 
them -if not all- have taught Turkish History in universities in Turkey or abroad, and all 
of them have published academic work, most of which have already seen 10th or 15th 
editions. The works of the ones such as Toktamış Ateş and Suna Kili were used in 
universities as text books. The two criteria I looked for while picking these names were: 
Being advocates of single-party, and being part of the academic circle. I deliberately did 
not include names such as İsmail Cem, because I directly looked for advocation of 
single-party. I tried to avoid economic or class-based analysis as much as possible, for 
while surely being valuable, they did not seem to be directly related to the topic I am to 
canvass. That is also why, among the people who objected to the justification of single-
party, I did not refer to Fikret Başkaya, whose analysis was more or less a class-based 
and economic one. 
 I've stated above that among the exponents of single party regime, I will single 
out one of them, and that is Nevin Yurdsever Ateş. My reason for treating her 
differently is because, among the single-party exponents, Ateş is the one who gets 
closest to proving that justification wrong, but fails to do it because of her bias. As I 
discussed in chapter IV, Ateş's published Ph. D. is about Progressive Republican Party 
(TPCF) and unlike majority of the Kemalist accounts, her treatment of the topic doesn't 
culminate with the assertion that TPCF was dominated by reactionaries. In fact, her 
specifically stating that TPCF members were not reactionaries, is suggestive. The study 
she meticulously carried out seems to be precluding her from reaching the biased 
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conclusion most of her single-party advocate colleagues reach, which is something to be 
admired. But still, she asks the question that if in 1925, proper elections were allowed, 
could the masses who had been subjects for hundreds of years determine their destiny 
logically.256 I should say that, Ateş does not answer this question directly negatively, 
but prevaricates by stating that we can not know that.  
 It is true that history can not be written with “what if”s, but what would happen 
if free elections had been allowed is different than asking what would happen if in 1943, 
Soviet army had been vanquished in Stalingrad by the Nazi's. The latter can not be 
answered because myriads of parameters will be included in the picture, but we can 
perhaps deliberate on the former. Perhaps we can at least say that people would vote 
and that there would be two parties in the parliament (Cemil Koçak argues that if in 
1930, there hadn't been fraudulent elections, CHP, the party in power, would probably 
lose it's position as power).257 What I'm trying to say here is that, having already 
decided to legitimize and justify single-party rule, Ateş falls into the trap of “conditions 
of the era,” even though in her work, she has identified the characteristics of TPCF, the 
first opposition party truly.    
 A very similar example goes on around the debate of the members of the first 
parliament, too, opened on 23rd April, 1920. Ahmet Demirel who conducted the most 
rigorous academic study about the first parliament resentfully states in the very 
beginning of his work, that the magisterial treatment in the Turkish historiography 
condemns the opposition in the first parliament as backwardness, reactionary, pro-
sultanate etc.258 Demirel goes on to analyze accounts one by one, presenting their 
outlooks. Then he gives a very interesting example where the historian İhsan Güneş, 
who rightly identifies the actions and the characteristics of the second group, but still 
ends up in falling to the cliche of “reactionary second group, progressive first group.”259 
This is an interesting example which tells us that the magisterial treatment of the second 
group within the Turkish historiography which basically deems the first group of 
Mustafa Kemal as “progressive” and second group as “reactionary” is so influential, 
that it can even effect a historian who in fact rightly identified the characteristics of the 
group.260 Nevin Yurdsever Ateş's treatment of the TPCF is different than her fellow 
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historians, but reaching more or less the same result is similar to the problem Demirel 
points out. In both situations, the end result is determined prior to the studies, and even 
if the studies might yield results opposite to historians' previous conclusions, their bias 
impedes them from reaching the true conclusions. 
 An interesting point as to the characteristic and results of the single-party period 
comes from Mahmut Goloğlu. In his four-tome-series, History of Turkish Republic, 
Goloğlu relates what happened during the single-party period (and briefly between 
1946-1950), both by citing parliament records and interpreting them. In Tek Partili 
Cumhuriyet, he touches upon the resentment of the congressmen some of whom are 
exasperated because of lack of audit and opposition. Goloğlu here, puts some of the 
blame on the congressmen, and also on the people of Turkey who allowed this process 
(meaning, the unbridled single-party regime). Goloğlu's tone reminds me of the parable 
of the frogs who desired a king. He discusses the inclination towards dictatorship and 
argues that, if at those times, there was really a disposition towards dictatorship, this 
could not have been realized with the desire and effort of one single person (meaning, 
Atatürk). He goes on that “the causes of every event that gives direction to the society, 
should again be looked for in that very society.”261 I agree with Goloğlu here to a 
certain extent. It can perhaps be argued that, if Atatürk is successful in establishing his 
single-party domination, it is because he gets help from people in doing so. It should not 
be forgotten that Law of Maintenance and Order was voted in the parliament and the 
majority voted in favour. This also means that he is successful in making people believe 
his dreams, and follow them. Still, this is a matter of conditions allowing for single-
party domination rather than necessitating it. What happened in Turkey during the 
single-party period may be argued within the Marxist debates of historical materialism 
(or determinism?), (and perhaps with the famous statement of Marx from The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that “Men make their own history, but 
they...do it under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past") 
but this, will again not allow us to accept that Turkey had to go through a single-party 
period because conditions necessitated so. 
 It is often the case that “conditions of the era” argument is uttered with 
comparisons with “today.” What was done during the single-party regime included 
dissolution of opposition parties and execution of proactive or potential dissenters. 
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Probably because these are unflattering actions, historians who advocate and legitimize 
single-party rule feel the need to stress that if these happened today, they wouldn't 
approve of them. Toktamış Ateş states in 1990's (in the book Mustafa Kemaller Görev 
Başına, a study compiled by Bedri Baykam in 1994), that today -meaning 1990's- he 
wouldn't approve of people from Welfare Party to be send to scaffolds. But Ateş also 
states that, at that time -meaning the time of Atatürk when opposition was suppressed 
by means of scaffolds- “it had to be like that.”262 Ahmet Taner Kışlalı gives a similar 
example, too, when he states that it should be taught to children that “Kemalizm is not 
wardership of what was done within the circumstances of 1920's.263 Ateş's statement is 
clear enough, and it needs no further clarification. Kışlalı's statement might sound a bit 
elusive, but I think we can easily assume that he means that in 1920's people were 
executed (and there was nothing wrong with that) but today, the same practices should 
not be applied.  
 The common denominator that brings together these two statements -and the 
likes of these can be easily found in the Kemalist literature- is that what was done can 
not be accepted today, but at that time, it was the right thing to do. This statement, in 
itself is problematic, because neither Kışlalı not Ateş offers any plausible and concrete 
reasoning as to why what was done at that time was true. The general assumption that 
what was done in the single-party period was due to conditions -the very statement 
which gave impetus to this thesis in the first place- is voiced myriads of time, but never 
with a convincing reasoning. Ateş, while summarizing the process all the opposition 
was suppressed in 1925, asserts that, “for the Turkish Republic not to be suffocated at 
birth, there was no other alternative.” This is the magisterial outlook by single-party 
exponents to the revolution and its pressures, but again, no cogent explanation is given 
anywhere.     
 I have argued throughout this work that the postulation that Turkish single-party 
was due to the conditions of the era is based on several premises. While discussing 
these premises, I have almost always used sources outside of the official arguments of 
the regime. That is to say, I have hardly ever discussed whether any of these arguments 
were voiced by the spokesman of the Kemalist regime, before or during the single-party 
regime. I will now make this more clear, and demonstrate that while some of the 
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arguments were voiced during the single-party period, the main assumption -that single-
party rule was ephemeral and was due to conditions- was not voiced until 1945, the last 
year of the single-party period.  
 The main idea that single-party was necessary due to the conditions, was uttered 
for the first time within the concept of “memorandum of the four,” a bill proposed in 
1946 to the parliament and offering to make the single-party regime softer (hence 
paving the way for the multi-party in the future). In this memorandum of the four, 
offered by the future founders of Democratic Party Adnan Menderes (the future prime 
minister), Refik Koraltan (the future parliament chair), Fuad Köprülü (founder of 
“scientific history” in Turkey in the words of Halil Berktay) and Celal Bayar (3rd 
president of Turkey) it is insinuated that the single-party period emerged as an 
exigency. Institutions from the Middle Ages and the unfavorable conditions of the 
country lead the party in power (meaning, CHP) to take precautions that would limit 
freedoms. Since there was no need for these precautions any more, and in a time when 
all around the world freedom and democracy won triumph, it was time to do away with 
the single-party rule.264   
 Whether Menderes, Koraltan, Köprülü and Bayar were intimate in stating that 
single-party period was due to conditions, or whether they were trying to panegyrize it 
in order not to get negative reaction is controversial. But for a thesis like this, it is 
important to point out that, the argument that single-party domination was due to the 
conditions was voiced for the first time in 1946, not by staunch Kemalists or single-
party advocates like Recep Peker, but by future Democratic Party founders. It should be 
noted that, this “memorandum of the four” directly incorporates 2 of the 4 premises I 
have discussed in this thesis: Transition from subject to citizen and Turkey's 
unfavorable conditions.        
 Whether European authoritarianism influenced Turkey and whether Turkey was 
a single-party state because most European states were so, could not have been 
discussed during the single-party years, at least not before the end of 1930's. As I have 
cited examples from Norman Davies, Mark Mazower and Michael Mann, not 1920's, 
but 1930's were the time authoritarian regimes rose in Europe. Perhaps the dilemma 
here would be that, although single-party proponents argue that “at that time” (meaning 
the time Turkey was a single-party state) European nations were falling prey to 
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totalitarianism one by one, Atatürk resentfully stated in 1930 that the landscape of 
Turkey is more or less a dictatorship and that he doesn't want to leave an institution of 
tyranny.265    
 That the revolutions were necessary to modernize the country and bring it to the 
level of civilized nations was voiced as early as 1924, and by Atatürk himself. In the 
Kemalist literature, this is uttered as either transition from subject to citizen (the 
material of chapter I) or as part of the modernization theory and Turkey's unfavorable 
conditions (chapter III). Ergün Aybars relates that when the opposition states that 
democracy can not be with one party and that Mustafa Kemal should remain impartial 
as the president, Mustafa Kemal replies this by stating that the deed is not done with the 
proclamation of the republic and that to join the civilized realm of the world, there 
should be no opposition for some more time.266 It is obvious that here, Aybars is 
defending Atatürk against the opposition, and goes on to say that, “His (Atatürk's, UD) 
being impartial means the end of the revolutions.”  
 This is the typical outlook developed by single-party exponents, and as I have 
discussed before, it is also manifested in the form of transition from subject to citizen. 
Again as Goloğlu relates, when in 1924, Atatürk declares that he will go on being the 
party leader despite also being the president, there is negative reaction to this from the 
press. Later, Atatürk is known to have stated that Turkey is in the beginning of a path, 
but has not yet advanced enough. Aybars's statement that Atatürk's being impartial 
would mean the end of revolution can be evaluated accordingly. Atatürk himself 
declared and sustained his single-party domination with the pretext that Turkey has yet 
“promises to keep and miles to go before she sleeps.” Atatürk's followers, on the other 
hand, claim the same thing to defend his single-party rule. In fact, one of the first and 
classic advocates of the necessity of the revolutions (hence the necessity of single-party 
regime) is Afet İnan. İnan, the adopted daughter of Atatürk, and the illustrious historian 
of the single-party regime, says that “we owe our place and development within the 
World Civilization to the Republic.” İnan confirms the necessity of the Ataturk 
revolutions with the following statement, and it can easily be seen in Turkey that these 
statements have become the repeated cliches of the Kemalist regime's advocates: The 
goal of revolutionary Ataturk within the issues of the nation is a Turkish nation 
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constantly developing within the World Civilization.267            
 That the opposition against Atatürk was reactionary is a common belief within 
the single-party advocates, although there are exceptions such as Nevin Yurdever Ateş. 
Majority of the single-party advocates agree that opposition organized against Atatürk 
had reactionary character -paving the way for their suppression soon- and this was 
voiced either by Atatürk himself or by the press that promotes his views as early as 
1924. As I discussed in chapter IV, Yunus Nadi wrote in 1926 that opposition in Turkey 
would always mean treason.268 It is also known that Atatürk himself did not welcome 
the organization of the opposition, and when the TPCF was founded, he said that he 
couldn't see anything essential in their program269 (since at that time, CHP itself did not 
have any program, Atatürk's sneering at TPCF's detailed program is suggestive. It seems 
that, rather than differing with TPCF founders on political terms, Atatürk is driven by 
envy and intolerance). Falih Rıfkı Atay, too, who can be identified as the ideologue of 
the Kemalist regime, was against opposition. Atay argued in 1930 that it was not the 
right time for an opposition party (meaning SCF), and he was also against İsmet Paşa's 
transferring to the multi-party regime.270  No matter what the reason was, opposition has 
always meant treason in Turkey (including today) perhaps starting from the late 
Ottoman period.  
 Throughout in this work, I've used the words “Kemalist” and “Atatürkist”. 
While differences can be made between these two, I should say here that I've used them 
interchangeably. Historians who argue that there was a necessity for the single-party 
and that Atatürk had to modernize the newly established Turkish state; I regarded them 
as Kemalist/Ataturkist. When I talk about Kemalist historiography, I mean the history 
writing that sees Turkish history from the vantage point of Atatürk. That is to say, the 
historians whom I treat as Kemalist are the ones who argue that there was a necessity 
for the single-party state and that reforms had to be made to turn a traditional society 
into a modern one. It is an interesting thing that in Turkey, Kemalist and Atatürkist can 
be used both differently or interchangeably. It is sometimes the case that people might 
claim that they are not Kemalists but Atatürkists. I think if we are to make a distinction 
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between these two, we should be cautious. One school of thought might suggest that 
Kemalizm is more strict compared to Atatürkism, and that Kemalizm, unlike 
Ataturkism, is a doctrine.271 Another idea is that they are the same thing and that they 
mean “the guidance of rationalism and science”.272 Finally, a third point of view is that, 
because the leaders of 12 September coup (1980) claimed that they took action with the 
motto of Ataturkism, people who detested their practices refused to be titled as 
Ataturkist. As Emre Kongar states, this went to the point of Yunus Nadi, a strict 
Ataturkist, to write a book with the title “I am not an Ataturkist.”273 We should not 
forget the fact that, ideologies mostly end with the suffix “ism,” and that unlike 
Atatürkism (which is in Turkish, pronounced as “Atatürkçülük,” without any “ism”) 
Kemalizm is an ideology, a doctrine. We should also keep in mind that, Kemalizm is 
older than Atatürkism, for the journal, “La Turquie Kemaliste” was being published as 
early as 1934. For a thesis whose primary purpose in only to question and challenge the 
single-party period, this much should be enough. I feel the need to reiterate that in this 
work, I used Kemalism and Ataturkism interchangeably. 
 The language used by single-party exponents should give us clues as to how they 
try to legitimize this process of suppression of opposition, and more than that, how the 
whole single-party period is justified. Destruction of opposition is presented with the 
words “attempt for multi-party democracy,” as if it was a magnanimous action 
embarked by Atatürk himself. Toktamış Ateş states that “there were two attempts for 
multi-party,”274 without being aware of the fact that, while these are not multi-party 
attempts, their “failing” (as mostly addressed by single-party exponents), means the de 
facto end of opposition itself. What I am trying to say is that, while the suppression of 
the opposition parties effectively destroyed opposition, this is presented in the Kemalist 
historiography as the “failures of attempts for democracy.” Accordingly, the 
establishment of Democrat Party in 1950 is presented as a desired goal of the revolution 
(claim of smooth transition), as if there had been any attempt to reach that goal during 
the single-party period.  
 As I've discussed in chapter III -and pointed out by Cemil Koçak-275 neither was 
it obvious (even in 1946) that the single-party would transform itself into a multi-party 
                                                
271   Emre Aköz, “Kemalizm ile Atatürkçülük arasındaki fark” Sabah, 25 Nov 2009.  
272   Emre Kongar, “Altı Ok ve Sosyal Demokrasi,” Cumhuriyet, 6 Sep 2014. 
273   Emre Kongar, “Kemalizm ve Sosyal Demokrasi.” 
274   Toktamış Ateş, “Altı Ok'un düşündürdükleri,” as in Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz, p. 239.    
275   Cemil Koçak, İkinci Parti, pp. 16 and 25.  
 
81  
 
regime, nor there was any considerable attempt for planting the seeds of a democracy 
during the single-party period (unlike what the single-party advocates claim). It is a 
great dilemma to offer that single-party period was ephemeral (and to claim that it was 
established to pave the way for multi-party) and to know that in 1931, the article which 
states Turkey as a single-party state was added to the party's program. As I've discussed 
above, it is not that single-party advocates are looking at the conditions and are reaching 
results accordingly; but it is the opposite. Cemil Koçak states this better by saying that 
unlike what the Kemalist postulation offers, Turkish single-party never had any 
intention to transform itself into multi-party before 1945, and that after World War II, it 
had to explain its past. The tutelage party theory which envisages that CHP wanted 
democracy in the long run is, as Koçak rightly diagnoses, is a product of this attempt to 
explain the past.276 The end result is to justify single-party period, so there arises a need 
to claim that single-party rule aimed true democracy. This matches with the assertion of 
Emre Kongar, too, who avers that there can be no doubt that Atatürk's aim was 
democracy.277 Since democracy is a positive concept and defense of permanent single-
party rule is out of question, it is argued by figures like Kongar that democracy was the 
true aim Atatürk wanted to reach.   
 While arguing that single-party was not the only option, I should be cautious 
about something. It can be argued that what Ataturk did was a revolution, and that “it 
takes some blood to cement the revolution.” I can not argue against this statement, nor 
do I claim that it can be justified or refuted, at least historically. The only way we can 
discuss this can be from an ethical perspective, but neither am I qualified for that, nor 
this is the place for it. Still, when we say that there can be no revolution without 
bloodshed, we are moving with the premise that revolutions themselves are necessary. I 
am not supporting the Marxist argument that revolution is progress, so here I will assert 
that Ataturk revolution was not a must; it was not the only choice.  
 I will finish this “conditions of the era” discussion with a parallel example from 
economy. I am strongly against the postulation which offers that conditions of the era 
entailed a single-party rule, as I've discussed in this thesis. However, a similar argument 
can be made about Turkish economy, and I wouldn't reject it. It can be argued, as both 
Cemil Koçak278 and Haldun Derin does, that Turkish industrialist lacked the necessary 
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capital in the early Republican years, so what came to be known as statism was 
developed to help making investments. While it can not be argued that people were not 
ready for democracy and that the ruling party CHP paved the way for democracy, it can 
perhaps be argued that the private sector did not have the sufficient needs for 
industrialization, hence the need for state's intervention in economy. As Derin points 
out, it can be asserted that “Turkish statism was limited with interventions to realize the 
outcome which otherwise wouldn't be at the desired level,”279 and again as Derin 
argues, this interventionist policy might have arisen “from a historical necessity”280 and 
“might be pertinent and just.”281 However, economic policy which is more or less 
limited to the economic field, should not be regarded the same as political tutelage, 
which can limit every kind of freedom, including people's attire.       
 The early years of Turkish Republic and its aftermath saw accounts that not only 
justify single-party rule, but adore Kemalism and present single-party period as kind of 
a golden age. It should not be forgotten that in 1950's, the shadows on the scarps of 
mountains that allegedly looked like the silhouette of Atatürk were interpreted as 
miracles!282 We can fortunately say that that attitude has pretty much faded. If 
approximately 20 historians I've analyzed for this thesis start their accounts with the 
apologetic statement that “when we evaluate Atatürk period, we have to take the 
conditions into consideration,” this means that they are aware that that period had 
certain problems and can not be treated as a golden age. This is a development in terms 
of Turkish historiography because it is important to move from the level of “Atatürk 
revolution is an immeasurable asset”283 to “Atatürk period should be evaluated taking 
the conditions into consideration.” This is, as Şükrü Hanioğlu argues, transition from 
“historiography of the most nobel feeling to apologetic historiography.”284 
 What I am suggesting in this thesis, is to leave the apologetic historiography 
aside, and face with the argument which advocates that conditions of the period entailed 
what was done during the single-party period. I've tried to demonstrate again and again 
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for 80 pages that what is offered as conditions of the era is not at all, persuasive. It is 
rather the cult of leadership, and perhaps Turkey's underdevelopment, which makes 
historians flatter single-party period. Stating that we should not measure Atatürk's time 
with the current time -no matter what that current time is- is not cogent at all. None of 
the single party advocates offers to measure it with the period of 1908-1912, a period 
whose every aspect was more plural and democratic than the single-party period of 
1920's and 1930's.  
 While concluding, there is one last thing that I must emphasize, for we have to 
understand against what kind of a problem we are faced with. Both the 
conceptualization of single-party period as golden age and as part of apologetic 
historiography, is part of official historiography. At primary and secondary school, 
students are exposed to a golden age narrative with portraits of Atatürk at the cover of 
every textbook and above the blackboard in each class. When they come to university, 
the golden age narrative leaves its place to apologetic accounts, and at times it is taught 
in the Atatürk Principle courses that what was done in early republican years was due to 
conditions. When the education system is left aside, most of Turkish Revolution books 
bare the apologist stance which I've taken pains to refute throughout all this work. 
Accounts by Ahmet Demirel, Şükrü Hanioğlu, Cemil Koçak or Ayşe Hür that do not 
defend the “conditions of the era” argument have relatively recently made their way into 
historiography. It can perhaps be argued that the magisterial history books of the 
previous generations were dominated by names such as Halil İnalcık, Suna Kili, or 
Toktamış Ateş, whose overall stance is apologist single-party advocation with the 
pretext of “conditions of the era.” 
 What I am trying to say is that, the apologist outlook dominant in Turkish 
historiography is as strong as its golden age counterpart has once been. Perhaps that's 
why, people who are to speak about single-party period -even if they have not read 
anything about this period- are very prone to defend it with the motto of “conditions of 
the era.” An ordinary person I can come across in the street or in social media is likely 
to say that what was done during single-party era was due to conditions. In this regard, 
Ergun Özbudun's -whom I can not classify as a staunch Kemalist- falling to this 
“conditions of the era” trap is suggestive. Even people who would not defend single-
party rule categorically (or who would not embrace the Le Bonian attitude that ignorant 
masses should not vote) might suggest that when Atatürk turned Turkey into a single-
party state, it was because of the conditions of the era, and that  his aim was democracy. 
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 Any would-be historian who intends to embark on a project of challenging the 
“conditions of the era” argument must accept that s/he is faced with a very successful 
and long-lived tradition. Single-party period was advocated in Turkey for years, first as 
the manifestation of a golden age narrative, and now as part of apologist historiography. 
Although ultimately incongruous, one must accept that the assertions single-party 
exponents defend are strong and, that to prove otherwise, one must go over all the 
assertions one by one, and find plausible and cogent counter-arguments. Dersim 
massacre is not something advocated as strongly as single-party rule itself, because it is 
very easy to condemn an action that killed thousands of people and which is tried to be 
justified by saying “those people were savages.” But when it comes to the establishment 
of single-party, the arguments are much stronger, and unfortunately, one must go quite 
deep to argue that Ottoman state was not theocratic or to refute the statement that 1920's 
of Europe was characterized by authoritarian/totalitarian regimes. When one accepts 
that Ottoman Empire was ruled by a god-like figure and that Atatürk introduced 
national sovereignty to an outdated society which had to go through a modernization 
process, single-party period almost justifies itself. That's why it has been the dominant 
treatment not only in the academia, but perhaps in everyday life, too.  
 For a long time, Turkish historiography treated single-party period of Turkey as 
a golden age, and only recently this golden age narrative turned into an apologist style. 
I've written this thesis to state that it is time we left this apologist historiography as well. 
And I believe we can. If apologist historiography was successful in replacing golden 
age narrative, realist historiography can take its place, too.                            
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